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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays which make use of laboratory experiments in 
order to investigate how procedural or contextual factors impact human behavior.  
The first essay concerns cooperative behavior in groups formed with quota-based selection rules. 
Participants are randomly assigned to either an orange or a purple group. In the quota treatment, 
orange participants are chosen as members of a selected group by performance in a simple unre-
lated math task whereas purple participants are chosen based solely on the quota. The results 
show significantly less cooperation (measured as behavior in a public good game) in the quota 
treatment compared to a control treatment where all participants are treated symmetrically. Fur-
thermore, this tendency is observed in both the orange and the purple participants, and regardless 
of the color of the matched player. 
The second essay describes the results of a Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment were we document 
that behavior is more cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is 
called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects 
is in control of her action. The social framing effect also vanishes when the game is played se-
iv 
 
quentially. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Community label triggers 
a desire to cooperate, but consistent with the hypothesis that social frames are coordination de-
vices. More generally, our evidence indicates that social frames enter beliefs rather than prefer-
ences. 
The third essay concerns testosterone change following monetary wins and losses and how these 
predict future financial risk-taking. We influence testosterone in male participants by having 
them win or lose money in a chance-based competition. Our design employs two treatments 
where we vary the amount of money at stake so that we can abstract from income effects. Con-
trolling for the difference in score, we find that men who win have a higher increase in testos-
terone than men who lose. We also find that men who experience a greater testosterone increase 
are more willing to make risky gambles and this association remains when controlling for 
whether the man won or lost the competition.  
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1. Quotas and Cooperation 
1.1 Introduction 
Selection by quotas is a commonly used policy tool for getting closer to a desired representation 
between genders, races or ethnicities. In political settings, the use of quotas is widespread 
(Krook, 2009) and its use has now also reached other spheres, such as the corporate world (see 
e.g. Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Even though quotas are often effective in reaching a specific 
numerical representation, there can be unintended side effects (Pande and Ford, 2011). The focus 
of this chapter is on one such effect, namely cooperation problems in groups created by quotas. 
 
In 2003, the Norwegian government unexpectedly announced that the country’s public limited- 
and state-owned companies would be required to have at least 40 percent representation of each 
gender on their boards by 2008 to avoid forced liquidation. The policy has been found to have 
affected the management practices of boards and adversely influenced short-run profits (Matsa 
and Miller, 2011; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). It has been hypothesized that one change in man-
agement practices was related to cooperation problems, which some boards experienced as a 
consequence of the quota (Stenseng, 2010; Dagens Naeringsliv, 2010; see also Clarke, 2010). 1 
 
Inefficient and uncooperative behavior following quotas or other procedures with preferential 
selection can also be found in other contexts, for example in education. In the United States, 
                                                 
1 Morten Huse and his coauthors have written extensively about the experience of women on corporate boards in 
Norway. In particular the discussion about how board members who enter the board by different procedures, for 
example women or employee representatives, may experience lower esteem than other board members is relevant 
for this chapter. See e.g. Huse and Solberg (2006), Huse et al. (2009), and Nielsen and Huse (2010). See also 
Terjesen et al. (2009). 
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quotas for minority students have been used at all levels of schooling in attempts to increase 
diversity of the student body. Sometimes the consequences have been dramatic, as was the case 
during the Boston riots in the 1970s following the institution of quotas for, and busing of, minor-
ity children to previously primarily white schools (Lukas, 1986). At both the college and the 
graduate school level quotas have been documented to lead to uncooperative behavior, for exam-
ple in the form of reluctance to share information, both within the student population and be-
tween students and teachers (Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979; Crosby and VanDeVeer, 2000). 
 
There are also examples of how affirmative action in the workplace can lead to cooperation 
problems. One area where this has been found is among firefighters. In the United States, affirm-
ative action and quotas have been used since the late 1960s to increase representation of female 
and minority firefighters. This has been claimed to lead to a decrease in cohesion and coopera-
tion between colleagues, both in training and on the job (Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979; 
Chetkovich, 1997). 
 
The above examples suggest that quotas can give rise to cooperation deficits. But whereas a sig-
nificant amount of research has been dedicated to understand the impact of quotas on group 
quality, there has been little systematic research regarding effects on cooperative behavior. The 
aim of this chapter is to use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether preferential selection 
in the form of an unrepresentative quota has a negative impact on group cooperation and, if so, to 
examine the underlying mechanisms.  
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The experimental method has some limitations. Key factors from the “real world” settings dis-
cussed above, such as interaction over longer time periods, will not be captured in the laboratory 
setting. However, laboratory experiments also have advantages: the controlled environment in 
the lab allows us to abstract away from pre-formed groups, such as gender or race, and focus on 
the process of how a group is formed. The laboratory environment also enables the researcher to 
use randomization to identify causation.  
 
In the experiment described in this chapter groups are created by randomly allocating the 16 par-
ticipants in each experimental session a color: either orange or purple. Participants are then asked 
to do a math task. In the unrepresentative quota treatment, four orange participants are chosen as 
members of a selected group by performance in the math task whereas four purple participants 
are chosen based on a quota that requires a certain representation of the two colors in the selected 
group. In the control treatment the orange and purple participants are treated symmetrically and 
all members of the selected group are chosen based on performance on the math task.  
 
This design captures two aspects of how unrepresentative quotas are often perceived: first, that 
one group is treated preferentially over the other in the selection process and second, that less 
weight is given to performance when selecting candidates from this group.2  
 
In order to study cooperative behavior, I next let the eight participants in the selected group play 
a two-person public good game. This is designed so that all members take part in seven public 
                                                 
2 These are not all potential aspects of unrepresentative quotas (others include slot-taking and fixed representation), 
but I limit the focus to these two aspects in this experiment. Note also that these two features, (1) preferential selec-
tion and (2) different role given to performance can describe also other situations than selection by quotas where 
favoritism plays a role.  
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good games: one against each other member of the selected group. Furthermore, the participants 
know the color of the person they are playing in each public good game. I find that cooperation 
is significantly lower when the selected group is created by the unrepresentative quota. In that 
case, participants contribute about 30 percent of their endowment to the public good, compared 
to a contribution rate of over 50 percent in the control treatment. I call this decline in cooperation 
the quota effect.  
 
In addition to establishing this result, this design makes it possible to draw some inferences about 
the mechanism underlying the quota effect. Various theories offering explanations for the quota 
effect have different predictions about whether the quota effect should be relation-specific (i.e. 
only be present in some relations in the group, for example when those who are not advantaged 
play with those who are advantaged) or general (i.e. apply similarly to all relations). I find that 
the quota effect is general, a finding which contradicts some theories, for example about the 
quota effect having its roots in a desire by those who are not advantaged by the quota to punish 
those who are advantaged.  
 
The experimental design also addresses a key policy aspect of quotas, namely the question of 
justification. Following on work which has shown that the acceptance of affirmative action poli-
cies can be affected by whether, and how, the policy is justified (see e.g. Murrell et al., 1994 and 
Heilman et al., 1996), I introduce two separate justifications for the unrepresentative quota, the 
first emphasizing efficiency gains and the second emphasizing fairness. However, even though 
participants report that they find our fairness argument especially convincing, they do not be-
come more cooperative when a justification is provided. 
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As discussed above, the unrepresentative quota in this experimental design captures two aspects 
of how affirmative action policies can be perceived. First, that it is a selection process that gives 
preferential treatment to one group over another. Second, that performance plays less of a role in 
selection for candidates from the group that is treated preferentially. In order to understand the 
respective role of these two aspects in causing the decrease in cooperation in the quota treatment, 
I also conduct two treatments that are identical to the two main treatments described above with 
the only difference that selection by performance is replaced with random selection. Hence, in 
this version of the quota treatment, preference is still given to one group, but the role of perfor-
mance is the same for both groups. I find that this version of the unrepresentative quota has no 
negative impact on cooperation relative to the control treatment of symmetric treatment.  
 
The research presented in this chapter is related both to the work on procedural fairness and pro-
cedural justice. The latter originally aimed at understanding the feelings of entitlement which can 
arise when individuals earn their roles in an experiment. (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985). A well-
known result in this strand of literature is due to Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996), who show that 
when the role as first mover in a dictator- or ultimatum game is earned, for example by answer-
ing a quiz, offers to receivers are significantly lower than when the role is allocated randomly. In 
the literature on procedural justice, it has instead been emphasized that a procedure which is per-
ceived as just may provide social motivation and thereby influences cooperative behavior (Lind 
and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992; Tyler and De Cremer, 2006). 
 
This chapter is also related to the research of Balafoutas and Sutter (2012). Their starting point is 
the work of Niederle et al. (2013), who show that an affirmative action procedure which guaran-
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tees women equal representation among the winners of a competition makes them as likely to 
enter a competitive setting as equally qualified men (in the absence of the affirmative action 
policy they find that women under-select into the competition, see also Gneezy et al., 2003; and 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). 
 
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) conduct an experimental investigation of the effects of such an af-
firmative action procedure on things other than willingness to compete. They follow the design 
of Niederle et al. (2013) and add a post-competition teamwork task and a coordination game. 
They find no effects from the quota on performance in the teamwork or the coordination task. 
Importantly however, the team task and the coordination game that they use do not incorporate 
conflicting motives between the group and the individual, i.e. their games are not social dilem-
mas. The research described here, on the other hand, uses a public good game in order to specifi-
cally study cooperation.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the experimental design, 
provides a conceptual framework and generates testable hypotheses. In Section 1.3, I outline and 
discuss the results from the experiment. Section 1.4 discusses different theories that make pre-
dictions about the effects of an unrepresentative quota and relates those theories to the experi-
mental results. Section 1.5 concludes.  
 
1.2 Experimental Design 
In the experiment 16 people participated in each session. After being seated in the laboratory, 
participants were told that the study would have several parts in which they could earn money. It 
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was also made clear that all the money earned would be paid to them in private at the end of the 
experiment and that the exchange rate between points in the experiment and dollars was such 
that 10 points corresponded to 3 dollars.3  
 
After these instructions were explained, the 16 people in each session were randomly allocated a 
color: either orange or purple.4 These colors were chosen since they are relatively neutral for 
American participants (unlike for example red vs. green). The participants were told their color 
allocation on the computer screen and were also given a silicon bracelet with their color to wear 
for the duration of the experiment. Thereafter they spent two minutes filling out a paper form 
with five associations to their color. This was done in order to give the participants some time to 
internalize their randomly allocated color.  
 
After randomization of colors, participants were told that they would be given a number of math 
tasks where each task would consist of adding up five two-digit numbers and that they would be 
paid 1 point (30 cents) for each correct answer. They had five minutes available to do as many 
tasks as possible with the maximum available tasks being 15. It was made clear that the number 
of tasks that they answered correctly would not be revealed until the end of the experiment.5  
 
                                                 
3 All experimental instructions can be found in Appendix A.1.  
4 The fact that colors were allocated randomly ensured that the characteristics of the two groups were similar, e.g. 
with regards to gender, age and ethnicity. See Appendix A.2 for details.  
5 This task has been used previously by among others Niederle and Vesterlund (2007, 2010) and performance has 
generally been found not to differ between different groups such as between gender or ethnicities. I confirm that 
there are no differences in performance between people of different ethnicities, but I find both gender and age dif-
ferences. See Appendix A.3. 
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After having solved math tasks for five minutes, part three of the experiment followed. Partici-
pants were told that out of the 16 people in the session, eight would be chosen as members of a 
selected group called the “high-stake group”. The other eight participants would remain in the 
study as members of the “regular-stake group”. The instructions made clear that the members of 
the two groups would do the same thing in the rest of the experiment, but that the high-stake 
group members would have the chance to earn more money. This design and the naming of the 
two groups was chosen in order to make it desirable to participants to be selected to the high-
stake group without imposing a specific context on the situation. 
 
It was also explained to the participants that the high-stake group would have four orange and 
four purple members. By varying the color composition of the underlying group of 16 partici-
pants (a composition which was made clear to all participants) this either meant that the two col-
ors were treated symmetrically (the underlying group then consisted of eight purple and eight 
oranges players) or an unrepresentative quota favoring the purples (in these sessions the under-
lying group contained four purple and twelve orange players).  
 
The aim of part four of the experiment was to measure the degree of cooperativeness within the 
high-stake group. I chose to do this with one of the classic social dilemmas, a two person public 
good game. In this game, participants were assigned to pairs and given a personal endowment of 
20 points (USD 6) in the high-stake group and 10 points (USD 3) in the regular-stake group. I 
selected a two-person public good game instead of a n-person public good game (with ݊ ൐ 2) so 
that it could be made clear to the participants which color the person had, with whom they were 
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playing each game. This was done in order to be able to assess whether participants treated peo-
ple of different colors differently. 
 
The public good game was conducted in a standard manner (see Ledyard, 1995 for a survey of 
public good game experiments), and both participants in the pair had to choose how much of 
their endowment to keep and how much to contribute to a joint project. Points contributed by the 
two participants were summed together, multiplied by 1.5 and then distributed equally between 
them. Everyone played the game with each of the other seven members of their group (either the 
high-stake- or the regular-stake group) and the contribution decisions were made simultaneously 
in each of the seven games. Participants were told that they would be paid according to the out-
come of one randomly chosen game out of the seven that they played. The only thing the partici-
pants were told about the person they played with in a specific game was that person’s color.  
 
After the participants had made their choices in all games, the experiment proceeded to a ques-
tionnaire in which the participants were asked to report their gender, age and ethnicity. In addi-
tion, the participants were asked if they found the process by which the members of the high-
stake group was chosen fair. 
 
1.2.1 Selection by performance: Treatments 1 and 2 
As described above, the high-stake group was put together such that it would consist of four pur-
ple and four orange players. In the main treatments the selection was done so that the four play-
ers of each color who performed best in the math task were admitted into the high-stake group. 
In the unrepresentative quota treatment (treatment 1), there were twelve orange and four purple 
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players in the underlying group of 16. This implies that when the four best performers of each 
color were selected, performance did not matter for the purple players, since all of them were 
automatically selected. This selection process was hence characterized by a quota that preferen-
tially treated the purple players, and made performance in the math task relevant only for the se-
lection of the orange players.  
 
I compare the participants’ behavior in the unrepresentative quota treatment (treatment 1) to the 
participants’ behavior in the control treatment (treatment 2). In the latter treatment there was 
equal representation of purple and orange players in the original group of 16 – i.e. there were 
eight orange and eight purple players. This meant that the two colors were treated symmetrically 
and the eight players who performed best in the math task in part 2 were in expectation selected 
into the high-stake group.6  
 
With the data from treatments 1 and 2 we can compare behavior in the public good game in a 
high-stake group consisting of four players of each color, which differs only in how the group 
members were selected: either by a process characterized by an unrepresentative quota for the 
purple, or by a process where all eight high-stake group members were selected by performance 
and symmetrically treated, regardless of color. This comparison allows us to investigate whether 
cooperative behavior differs depending on the selection process. In addition, by examining if the 
                                                 
6 Note that selection may still not be entirely by performance. If, for example, there are five purple and three orange 
players among the eight best performers, only the four best of the purples will be selected and one orange player 
who is not among the eight best will be admitted into the high-stake group. As a future extension of this work, it 
would be interesting to compare this situation with one where the eight best players are chosen, completely disre-
garding their colors.  
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players’ behavior depends on their own color and/or on the color of the person they are playing a 
particular game with, we can draw some inferences about the mechanism at work.  
 
1.2.1.1 Justification of the Unrepresentative Quota: Treatments 1b and 1c 
In the unrepresentative quota treatment (treatment 1) described above, participants were not pro-
vided any explanation for the preferential treatment that the purple players were given. When 
quotas are used it is most often for one of two reasons. A first argument that is commonly used 
for quotas is that they are there to enhance efficiency. For example, advocates of corporate-board 
quotas for women claim that they will lead to more valuable perspectives being represented on 
the board, which in turn will improve the board’s decision making and the company’s perfor-
mance (see e.g. Daily and Dalton, 2003; and Huse and Solberg, 2006). Second, it is sometimes 
argued that a quota corrects unfairness. Examples of this can be found in the policy of affirma-
tive action in the United States that gives preference to members of minority groups (for example 
African Americans) with reference to this process being a compensation for previous unjust 
treatment of members of this community (see e.g. Heilman et al., 1996 and Murrell et al. 1994).  
 
To be able to address this practical policy aspect of quotas, I designed two additional treatments 
that were versions of the unrepresentative quota treatment, in which justifications along the 
above lines were given.  
 
Treatment 1b was identical to treatment 1 with the exception that an efficiency argument for the 
quota was given: When the difference between the high-stake and the regular-stake group was 
introduced to the participants, the instructions explained that the payoff rule was such that the 
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members of the high-stake group would only have a higher endowment than the members of the 
regular-stake group if the high-stake group had an equal proportion of purple and orange players. 
When the process by which the high-stake group members were selected was explained, the 
instructions pointed out that when all the four purple players were selected the arrangement ful-
filled the requirement of equal proportions for the high-stake group, hence giving all high-stake 
group members the chance to earn more money than what would otherwise have been the case. 
 
Treatment 1c was designed to capture the fairness argument, which was done by introducing a 
harder math task in which the numbers that were to be added up had three digits instead of two. 
The instructions then pointed out that there were two math tasks, one easy and one hard, and that 
the four purple players would do the hard math task. They would still be compensated with 1 
point (30 cents) for every correct answer and the had the same amount of time available. When it 
was explained how the selection into the high-stake group would work, it was stated that all the 
four purple players were put in the high-stake group as a compensation for the fact that they did a 
harder math task. 
 
Treatments 1, 1b and 1c are identical in the sense that in all three cases, the four orange players, 
out of a total of 12, with the best performance in the math task were admitted into the high-stake 
group whereas the four participants who were randomly selected to be purple were automatically 
admitted into the high-stake group. The difference between the three treatments is that whereas 
there was no rationale for the preferential treatment of purples in treatment 1, treatments 1b and 
1c provided, respectively, an efficiency- and a fairness justification. These two versions of 
treatment 1 allow us to better understand whether the effect of the unrepresentative quota on 
13 
 
purples on cooperation in the public good game is different when a rationalization for the quota 
is given and, in turn, if it matters how the quota is rationalized.  
 
1.2.2 Random Selection: Treatments 3 and 4 
The unrepresentative quota, as it is designed in this experiment, captures two different aspects of 
how quotas are often perceived. First, that the selection process gives preferences to one group 
over another and second, that performance plays less, or no, role when candidates from the pref-
erentially treated group are selected.  
 
In order to understand the role played in generating the quota effect by these two factors, I de-
signed treatments 3 and 4, which were identical to treatments 1 and 2 respectively, with the only 
difference being that the selection into the high-stake group was done randomly instead of by 
performance. Treatment 3 was the unrepresentative quota treatment with random selection, 
where the four purple players were automatically chosen for the high stake group whereas four 
of the twelve orange players were randomly selected. Treatment 4 was the control treatment with 
random selection, where four purple and four orange players were chosen out of the totally eight 
orange and eight purple participants.  
 
By comparing the behavior in the public good game in the high-stake group between treatments 
3 and 4, we can learn whether any differences in cooperation that are found between treatments 1 
and 2 also appear in a similar environment where selection is not done on the basis of perfor-
mance.  
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Since treatments 3 and 4 use random selection by design and no reference is made to perfor-
mance in the math task, we can also use these treatments to investigate whether there is an inher-
ent relationship between how well a person performs on the math task and how she behaves in 
the public good game. This is important in order to rule out the possibility that differences in 
behavior between treatments 1 (and 1b and 1c) and 2 are associated with math ability and its ef-
fect on public good game behavior.  
 
1.2.3 Implementation 
The experiment was conducted at the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory and a total of 22 ses-
sions were run. There were five sessions each of treatments 1 and 2, three sessions each of treat-
ments 1b and 1c, and three sessions each of treatments 3 and 4.7 The sessions were conducted 
over the course of four days in late October and early November 2011 and five days in April 
2012.8 All sessions had 16 participants who were recruited through the SONA system at the 
Harvard Decision Science Laboratory. Out of the total of 352 participants, who were only al-
lowed to participate once, 55.4 percent were women. The median age was 23 years and the par-
ticipants earned on average 23 USD (including a USD 10 show-up fee) for participating in an ex-
perimental session that lasted about 45 minutes.  
 
                                                 
7 Two additional sessions which were started had to be interrupted and canceled due to computer and network 
malfunctioning. Participants in these two sessions were paid for their partial participation and were not allowed to 
participate again.  
8 In October/November 2011, treatments 1 and 2 were conducted. In April, treatments 1 and 2 were replicated and 
the other treatments were added. Apart from this, treatments were randomly allocated between sessions. The data on 
treatments 1 and 2 show no seasonal differences depending on whether data collection was done in Octo-
ber/November or in April. Pooled data from these two sets of sessions is therefore used in the analysis. Further de-
tails are given in Appendix A.4.  
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The participants arrived at the lab a few minutes before the scheduled start and signed consent 
forms. When 16 people had arrived they were taken to the lab by the experimenter.9 They were 
all seated in one room, in 16 separate cubicles. The cubicles prevented them from seeing what 
any other participant was doing and which color he or she had been allocated. The experiment 
was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and instructions were given both verbally, to en-
sure common knowledge, and on the participants’ computer screens. Key pieces of information 
were also given on paper so that the participants could review these parts of the instructions at 
any time. Participants made all their decisions on the laboratory computers.  
 
Instructions were given before each part of the experiment. Before the math task in part 2 and 
before the public good game in part 4, participants answered quizzes in order to ensure that eve-
ryone had understood the instructions correctly. The participants had to answer all questions 
correctly for the computer program to continue to the next screen. Those who experienced diffi-
culties in answering any of the questions could request help by pressing a help button and they 
then received additional explanation in private by the experimenter. Thereafter they answered the 
questions in the quiz again.10  
 
1.2.4 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Generation 
I use the inequity-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to model the two-person public 
good game.  
                                                 
9 Over-recruitment was planned in order to reduce the probability that sessions had to be cancelled due to too few 
participants showing up. The 16 individuals who showed up first were allowed to participate in the session. Any 
additional participants above the first 16 received only the show-up fee of USD 10 and could not participate.  
10 Note was taken of the (very few) participants who experienced substantial difficulties in understanding the 
instructions. Excluding these observations does not make a difference to the results of the analysis. 
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Consider two individuals, ݅ and ݆, who are matched in a public good game. Each individual has 
an endowment ݕ௜ and decides how much of the endowment to keep and how much to contribute 
to a joint project (contributions by individual ݅ are denoted ܿ௜). The total contributions made by 
both individuals are multiplied by ܴ, which is the return of the project, and the resulting amount 
is shared equally between ݅ and ݆. The monetary payoff for individual ݅ is hence:  
ߨ௜ሺܿ௜, ௝ܿሻ ൌ ݕ௜ െ ܿ௜ ൅
ܴ
2
൫ܿ௜ ൅ ௝ܿ൯. 
If 1 ൑ ܴ ൑ 2 this is a social dilemma, i.e. setting ܿ௜ ൌ 0 maximizes profit for individual ݅ but 
setting ܿ௜ ൌ ݕ௜ maximizes total social payoff for the two participants. In this experimental design 
ܴ ൌ 1.5.  
 
Contributions in one-shot public good games are usually well above zero (see survey of public 
goods studies in Ledyard, 1995). This is a puzzle if players only care about their own monetary 
payoffs, but not if at least some players care also about the equality of payoffs. Following Fehr 
and Schmidt I assume that the utility of individual ݅ is  
௜ܷ ൌ ߨ௜ െ ߙ௜ max൫ߨ௜ െ ߨ௝, 0൯ െ ߚ௜ max൫ߨ௝ െ ߨ௜, 0൯. 
 
This utility function captures two things; first that a deviation from equal payoffs is aversive and 
second that this disutility may differ depending on whether the inequality comes from individual 
݅ having a lower or a higher payoff than individual ݆ (Fehr and Schmidt assume that ߙ௜ ൑ ߚ௜, i.e. 
that people suffer more from inequality that is to their disadvantage). 
 
An individual with this utility function that is deciding how much to contribute in the public 
good game will need to form beliefs about how much the other person will contribute. Now there 
17 
 
is no longer a unique equilibrium with ܿ௜ ൌ 0, but all contributions levels such that 0 ൑ ܿ௜ ൑ ݕ௜ 
can be equilibria when supported by appropriate beliefs about ௝ܿ. The extent to which partici-
pants contribute to the joint project in a public good game is viewed as a measure of cooperation, 
since all contributions such that ܿ௜ ൐ 0 are signaling other-regarding preferences (either in the 
form of a higher ߙ௜ or ߚ௜ or as more positive beliefs about the contributions of the other player’s 
contribution, ௝ܿ). 
 
This experiment tests whether there is less cooperation in a group that is put together by an un-
representative quota (treatment 1) than in the control treatment where all participants are treated 
symmetrically and selected by performance (treatment 2). That implies that I am testing the null 
hypothesis of no difference in public good contribution against the alternative hypothesis that 
there is a difference in public good contribution between these two treatments. To understand the 
role of justification for the quota effect, I look at contributions to the public good in the two 
treatments where a justification is given, treatments 1b (efficiency justification) and 1c (fairness 
justification), and test the null hypothesis that they are the same as in treatment 1, where no justi-
fication was given. 
 
Section 1.4 discusses different theories that could support a difference in cooperative behavior 
between the two treatments. As explained there, an important step to distinguish between the 
different mechanisms is to look at behavior broken down by the color-match of the two players, 
i.e. by whether the participant herself, and the person to whom she is matched, belong to the 
group which is disadvantaged or advantaged by the unrepresentative quota system. I hence test 
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the null hypothesis that the difference between public good contribution in treatments 1 and 2 is 
the same for all color-matches against the alternative hypothesis that they are not all the same.  
 
As discussed above, the unrepresentative quota in treatment 1 (and 1b and 1c) captures two as-
pects of how quotas are often perceived: preferential treatment and an asymmetric role for per-
formance in the selection of candidates from the different groups. In order to understand the role 
of these features in generating the quota effect I consider contributions to the public good in 
treatments 3 and 4. In both of these treatments, selection is made randomly into the high-stake 
group. However, whereas there is an unrepresentative quota for purples in treatment 3, partici-
pants of both colors have the same chance of being selected in treatment 4. I test the null hypoth-
esis of no difference in average contribution to the public good in these treatments. 
 
1.3 Results 
The experimental design, where each participant is making decisions in seven public good 
games, implies that there are multiple behavioral data points for each participant. It is hence im-
portant to adjust standard errors for the fact that observations for a single individual are not inde-
pendent. In the analysis below, this is done by clustering standard errors on individual.11 As an 
additional measure, in order to be as conservative as possible in testing the hypotheses, the tests 
utilize standard errors that are also clustered at the level of the experimental session in which the 
data were generated.12  
                                                 
11 Another way of handling the data is to calculate the average for each participant, and hence only use one data 
point per participant. The results reported here are not sensitive to the choice of either method.  
12 See Fréchette (2012) for a discussion about potential session effects in laboratory experiments. The two-dimen-
sional clustering (i.e. clustering on both individual and experimental session) that is used here is an extension of the 
standard cluster-robust variance estimator for one-dimensional clustering, see Cameron et al. (2011). The results 
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1.3.1 Selection by performance: Treatments 1 and 2 
We begin by looking at the results for treatments 1 and 2. Treatment 1 is the unrepresentative 
quota treatment, in which the four purple players were automatically selected for the high-stake 
group whereas the orange players were selected based on their performance in the math task. In 
the high-stake group in this treatment, average contribution in the public good game was 32.7 
percent of the endowment. Treatment 2 is the control treatment in which four players of each 
color were selected based on performance in the math task. Under this condition, contributions in 
the public good game were on average 54.7 percent. These data are outlined in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session. Number of obser-
vations: 560, number of participants: 80, number of sessions: 10.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
reported here are not sensitive to decisions regarding clustering of standard errors, see Appendix A.5. This appendix 
also concerns potential sensitivity to distributional assumptions and how the results reported here are robust to the 
use of non-parametric tests, such as the Mann-Whitney test.  
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The difference in public good contribution between the two treatments is 22.0 percentages 
points, which in turn is highly statistically significant (p <  0.0113). We therefore have the fol-
lowing result: 
 
Result 1: There is significantly less cooperation in the public good game when the high-stake 
group is put together by the unrepresentative quota than in the control treatment.  
 
We continue by breaking down the results by whether the player is orange (and hence disadvan-
taged by the unrepresentative quota in treatment 1) or purple (and hence advantaged by the quota 
in treatment 1). Figure 1.2 shows these data. 
 
Figure 1.2: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 1 and 2, by Color. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session. Number of obser-
vations: 560, number of participants: 80, number of sessions: 10.  
                                                 
13 This p-value and all other p-values reported below, unless otherwise noted, come from two-sided t-tests with 
standard errors clustered as described above. See Appendix A.6 for further details.  
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We see that for the oranges, who were disadvantaged by the quota, we have an average contribu-
tion of 30.7 percent in treatment 1, compared to 54.2 percent in treatment 2, i.e. a quota effect of 
23.5 percentage points (p <  0.01). For the purples, the contribution levels are 34.8 percent and 
55.1 percent in treatment 1 and 2 respectively, and the quota effect is hence 20.3 percentage 
points (p <  0.05). A difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the 3.2 percentage point dif-
ference in the quota effect between oranges and purples is not statistically significant. We there-
fore have the following result:  
 
Result 2: In the unrepresentative quota treatment, both those disadvantaged and those advan-
taged by the quota cooperate less compared to the control treatment.  
 
We continue the analysis of the results from treatments 1 and 2 by looking at whether there is a 
difference between how players act when they play the public good game with others who have 
the same color compared to those who have the other color. This can be seen in Figure 1.3.  
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Figure 1.3: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 1 and 2, by Color of 
Matched Player. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session. Number of obser-
vations: 560, number of participants: 80, number of sessions: 10.  
 
From the data shown in Figure 1.3, two conclusions can be drawn. We first note that there is less 
cooperation in the public good game in the unrepresentative quota treatment than in the control 
treatment regardless of whether participants play with someone who has the same color as them-
selves or with someone of the other color. The quota effect is 19.5 percentage points when par-
ticipants play with others who have the same color (p < 0.01) and 23.8 percentage points when 
the game is against someone of the other color (p < 0.01). The difference in difference is not 
statistically significant. A second conclusion is that the participants display an ingroup favoritism 
similar to what has been found in previous research even if it is not what is driving the quota ef-
fect.14 Considering both treatments, we find that participants contribute significantly less (on 
                                                 
14 Ingroup favoritism refers to the fact that people easily divide themselves and others into social categories and treat 
members of the own group (the ingroup) more favorable than people in other groups (the outgroup(s)). The condi-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Unrep. Quota (T1) Control (T2) Unrep. Quota (T1) Control (T2)
Playing w Same Color Playing w Other Color
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
G
‐C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
23 
 
average 3.9 percentage points, p <  0.05) when the person they are playing a game with does not 
have their color. However, even though significant, this effect is small compared to the quota 
effect of 22.0 percent (a t-test where the null hypothesis is that the size of the two effects are the 
same size is rejected with p <  0.01). Our third and fourth results are hence:15 
 
Result 3: The quota effect is present and does not statistically differ in size depending on whether 
the matched players have the same color or not.  
 
Result 4: Considering both the unrepresentative quota- and the control treatment, there is 
ingroup favoritism in the sense that participants contribute more when playing with people of the 
same color. 
 
As discussed above, a key step in understanding which mechanism drives the quota effect is to 
examine in greater depth whether there are differences in how the people of the two different 
colors play with each other. This is graphed in Figure 1.4.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
tions for this effect to arise are weak, and the effect is hence often refered to as the “minimal group paradigm” 
(Tajfel, 1970). See also Tajfel and Billig, 1971. Ingroup favoritism is discussed further in Section 4.1 below.  
15 It can be hypothesized that the ingroup favoritism in this setting could be suppressed by the fact that participants 
saw all seven games simultaneously on the screen and therefore felt that they ought to treat participants of different 
colors similarly. One way to, at least indirectly, investigate this is to check for order effects, i.e. if participants whose 
first game involved someone of their own color behaved differently against all players (e.g. anchored at a higher 
cooperation level) than those whose first game was against a player of the other color. The analysis in Table A.4 in 
Appendix A.5 shows that no such order effects can be found in the data.  
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Figure 1.4: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 1 and 2, by Color of 
Matched Player. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session. Number of obser-
vations: 560, number of participants: 80, number of sessions: 10.  
 
Figure 1.4 shows that there is less cooperation in the unrepresentative quota treatment than in the 
control treatment, regardless of the match between the player’s own color and the color of the 
person she plays with. The point estimate of the quota effect is largest when orange players play 
with purple players (24.1 percentage points) and smallest when purple players play with other 
purples (16.3 percentage points). However, the quota effect is statistically significant for all 
combinations of colors (orange to orange: p <  0.01, orange to purple: p <  0.01, purple to pur-
ple: p <  0.1, purple to orange: p <  0.01) and the differences in point estimates of the quota 
effect are not statistically different from one another. Our fifth result is therefore: 
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Result 5: The quota effect is present for all combinations of matched players’ colors and not sta-
tistically different in size among the different cases. 
 
As described in Section 1.2, I also asked the participants about whether they perceived the pro-
cedure through which the high-stake group was selected as fair. We will now look at the data 
from these questions.16 Figure 1.5 outlines these data for treatments 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 1.5: Fairness Perception, Treatments 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data are from high-stake- and regular-stake group and show percentage of participants who regarded the selection 
process into the High-stake Group fair. Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test. Number of observa-
tions = number of participants: 160, number of sessions: 10.  
 
                                                 
16 For the fairness data we only have one observation per participant (which is that participant’s assessment of the 
fairness of the procedure) and hence the above discussion about clustering on the level of the individual does not 
apply here. Reported p-values from test on fairness data come from two-sided t-tests.  
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Figure 1.5 shows that 60.7 percent of participants found the process fair in the unrepresentative 
quota treatment, compared to 80.3 percent of participants in the control treatment. The difference 
of 19.6 is statistically significant (p <  0.05). We can therefore conclude that the unrepresentative 
quota was viewed as a more unfair process by the participants than the process in which every-
one was selected based on performance.  
 
1.3.1.1. Justification of the Unrepresentative Quota: Treatments 1b and 1c 
As discussed in Section 1.2 some previous research suggests that the acceptance for affirmative 
action policies is higher when the policy is justified. I test whether justifications of the use of an 
unrepresentative quota have an effect on group cooperation with treatments 1b and 1c.  
 
In treatment 1b, an efficiency argument was given as a rationalization for the use of the quota. 
The participants were told that the payoff rule for part 4 was such that the high-stake group 
would only have higher stakes than the regular-stake group if the high-stake group consisted of 
an equal number of orange and purple players. When the unrepresentative quota was introduced, 
it was done with reference to this payoff rule, pointing out that the unrepresentative quota guar-
antees equal representation of both colors and hence higher endowments for all members of the 
high-stake group. The result of this treatment in relation to treatments 1 and 2 is shown in Figure 
1.6.  
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Figure 1.6: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 1, 1b and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session. Number of obser-
vations: 728, number of participants: 104, number of sessions: 13.  
 
Figure 1.6 reveals that the contribution level in treatment 1b was 28.6 percent. This is not statis-
tically different from the case with no justification and the difference of 26.0 percentage points 
between treatments 1b and the control treatment, treatment 2, is highly statistically significant 
(p <  0.01).  
 
In treatment 1c, the unrepresentative quota was rationalized as a compensation for previous un-
fair treatment. The four purple participants had to do a harder math task (summing up three-digit 
numbers instead of two-digit numbers) without getting compensated in terms of higher payoffs 
per correct answer. The fact that they were all automatically selected for the high-stake group 
was framed as making up for this unfairness. Figure 1.7 below outlines the extent to which par-
ticipants contributed in the public good game in treatments 1 and 1c, compared to treatment 2. 
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Figure 1.7: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 1, 1c and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session.  Number of 
observations: 728, number of participants: 104, number of sessions: 13.  
 
As is evident from Figure 1.7, the fact that the quota was given with this justification did not 
have a positive impact on the cooperation level, compared to the situation in which the quota was 
left unjustified, as there is no statistical difference in cooperative behavior between treatments 1 
and 1c. The difference between cooperation in treatment 1c and treatment 2 of 22.5 percentage 
points is however statistically significant (p <  0.01). The analysis of treatments 1b and 1c, in ad-
dition to the analysis of treatments 1 and 2, hence gives us the following result: 
 
Result 6: There is less cooperation when the group is put together by an unrepresentative quota, 
compared to the situation where everyone is selected by performance. This difference remains 
even when the unrepresentative quota is justified with either an efficiency- or a fairness argu-
ment.  
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It is important to note that these results do not imply that there are no possible justifications that 
could increase cooperation in the unrepresentative quota treatment to the level that we see in the 
control treatment. However, they do suggest that the negative effect of the unrepresentative 
quota on cooperation is quite robust.17 
 
In Figure 1.8 we again look at the participants’ perception of whether or not the selection process 
was perceived as fair and consider the two treatments in which a justification for the use of the 
unrepresentative quota was provided.  
 
Figure 1.8: The Impact of Quota Justification on Fairness Perception 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data are from high-stake- and regular-stake group and show percentage of participants who regarded the selection 
process into the High-stake Group fair. Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test between adjacent cate-
gories. Number of observations = number of participants: 256, number of sessions: 16. 
                                                 
17 The reason that Section 3.1.1 does not describe the data from treatments 1b and 1c broken down by color of the 
player and/or the matched partner is that such an analysis does not add any new insights compared to what was dis-
cussed in the first part of section 3.1. For the interested reader the material is available from the author.  
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In Figure 1.8 we see that the two justifications had different effects on participants. The effi-
ciency justification given for the use of a quota in treatment 1b did not change participants’ per-
ception of equity in the process as there was no statistically significant difference between the 
fairness perception in treatment 1 and 1b. However, appealing to the fairness justification for the 
use of an unrepresentative quota in treatment 1c, the selection was perceived to be more fair 
(p <  0.1) than in treatment 1, where no reason for the quota was given.  
 
These data add an interesting dimension to the results described above. Even though the argu-
ment used in treatment 1c worked in the sense that participants did find the process more fair, it 
did not have an impact on participants’ behavior in the public good game, compared to the situa-
tion in which no justification was given for the unrepresentative quota.  
 
1.3.2 Random Selection: Treatments 3 and 4 
In order to distinguish between the roles played by the two aspects of quotas (preferential selec-
tion and an asymmetric role of performance) for generating the quota effect, I also implemented 
two treatments that were identical to treatments 1 and 2 with the difference that selection by per-
formance in the math task was removed. Instead participants were randomly selected into the 
high-stake group. In treatment 3, which is the unrepresentative quota treatment with random 
selection, the four purple participants were automatically selected into the high-stake group. The 
four orange participants, however, were randomly selected from a total of twelve orange partici-
pants. In treatment 4, which is the control treatment with random selection, there were eight 
players of each color in each session and four of each color were randomly selected for the high-
stake group. Figure 1.9 outlines the data from treatments 3 and 4.  
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Figure 1.9: Contribution in PG game, High-stake group, Treatments 3 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test with se clustered on participant and session.  Number of 
observations: 336, number of participants: 48, number of sessions: 6.  
 
From Figure 1.9 we learn that in treatment 3, contribution to the public good was 49.3 percent of 
the maximum whereas it was 41.3 percent in treatment 4. This difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. Furthermore, a difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the quota effect is not the 
same when selection is made randomly as when it is made by performance (p <  0.01). This 
gives us the following result: 
 
Result 7: When selection by performance is removed and participants are instead selected ran-
domly into the high-stake group, there is no negative effect of the unrepresentative quota on 
cooperation in the public good game.  
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This result highlights the importance of the selection mechanism for the quota effect to arise. 
When those who were disadvantaged by the quota were selected by performance in the math task 
there was a negative effect on cooperation from the unrepresentative quota, but this effect went 
away when the selection was instead made randomly. From this we learn that a preferential 
selection of one color above the other is not enough to trigger lower cooperation but that the 
difference in selection criteria, and the role of performance, is decisive.  
 
In Figure 1.10 we again ask whether participants find the process fair or unfair and consider 
these data for treatments 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 1.10: Fairness Perception, Treatments 3 and 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data are from high-stake- and regular-stake group and show percentage of participants who regarded the selection 
process into the High-stake Group fair. Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for a t-test. Number of observa-
tions = number of participants: 96, number of sessions: 6. 
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Figure 1.10 reveals that whereas 62.8 percent found the selection process fair in treatment 3, the 
corresponding figure for treatment 4 was 95.6 percent. This difference of 32.8 percentage points 
is highly statistically significant (p <  0.01). This is interesting as we also just noted that there 
was no quota effect on cooperative behavior with random selection. This further supports our 
conclusion that the effect that the unrepresentative quota has on cooperation is not primarily 
about stated fairness perceptions. Even though participants found the unrepresentative quota in 
treatment 3 as unfair as in treatment 1, there was no quota effect when selection was made 
randomly instead of based on performance. Also, even though the participants report that they 
view the unrepresentative quota as more fair when the justification in treatment 1c is given, this 
does not change the level of cooperation compared to when no justification is given. 
 
1.3.3 Math Task and Public Good Game – is there an Intrinsic Relation? 
Since selection in treatments 3 and 4 is made randomly and no references to performance in the 
math task is made, data from these treatments make it possible to also investigate whether there 
is an intrinsic relationship between how a person performs in the math task and how she behaves 
in the public good game. Figure 1.11 shows a scatter plot of the number of correct answers in the 
math task against the percentage contribution in the public good game.  
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Figure 1.11: Math Task Performance and Public Good Contribution, Treatments 3 and 4. 
 
Data are from high-stake- and regular-stake group. N=96. Dark gray dots denote treatment 3 and light gray dots 
denote treatment 4.  
 
Figure 1.11 suggests that there is no relation between the two. This is also confirmed in regres-
sion analysis (OLS) where the percentage contribution is regressed on the number of correct an-
swers in the math task as the coefficient on number of correct answers in the math task is insig-
nificant.18  
 
This result tells us that the reason that we see less cooperation in treatment 1 than in treatment 2 
is not a consequence of an inherent relationship between scores in the math task and behavior in 
the public good game.  
 
                                                 
18 This is true also when controls are added for whether the participant was in treatment 3 or 4, the color which the 
participant was randomly given and whether or not she was randomly selected into the high-stake group. See Table 
1.1 for regression results with controls.  
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Table 1.1: Math Task Performance and Public Good Contribution, Treatments 3 and 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS. Levels of significance: * p <  0.1, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01. Dependent variable: Percentage public good 
contribution. High-stake group is a dummy equal to 1 if the participant was randomly chosen as a member of the 
high-stake group. Orange is a dummy equal to 1 if participant is orange. Quota is a dummy equal to 1 for treatment 
3.  
 
1.4 Why a Quota Effect? 
I have defined the quota effect as the negative impact that an unrepresentative quota has on co-
operative behavior in a social dilemma, compared to a situation in which everyone in the group 
is treated symmetrically and selected by performance. In this section I discuss theories and pre-
vious research that provide explanations as to why we might see this effect. I start by looking at 
theories predicting a relation-specific quota effect and thereafter I consider research pointing in 
the direction of a general quota effect. Throughout, the theories are related to the results from the 
experiment.  
 
 
(1) (2)
Correct ‐0.007 ‐0.009
(0.09) (0.10)
High Stake Group ‐0.035
(0.07)
Orange ‐0.05
(0.07)
Quota 0.05
(0.07)
Constant 0.528*** 0.986*
(0.09) (0.55)
N 96 96
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1.4.1 A Relation-Specific Quota Effect 
Several theories which can explain the existence of a quota effect also make the prediction that 
this should only appear in certain relations within the group, for example when those who were 
not advantaged by the quota interact with those who were advantaged. Here three such theories 
are considered.  
 
First, there is ingroup favoritism (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971), which captures people’s ten-
dency to put themselves and others into categories, and the fact that this categorization gives rise 
to favorable treatment of the people in the same social group as oneself compared to those in 
other groups (see also MacDermott, 2009; and Chen and Li, 2009). Ingroup favoritism has been 
found also with random groups, for example put together by a coin flip (Locksley et al., 1980). 
In a setting with quotas and affirmative action, the ingroup bias may be at play, since a suffi-
ciently strong decrease in cooperation with the outgroup as a consequence of the quota could 
lead to a decline in overall cooperation (see also Goette et al., 2006 and Bernard et al., 2006). 
 
However, the experimental findings in this chapter are not predicted by ingroup favoritism. Spe-
cifically, if it were a stronger feeling of ingroup- versus outgroup-identity that was the primary 
difference between the control and the quota treatments, we would expect to see the quota effect 
more strongly when participants play with those of the other color. As we do not observe this, it 
can be concluded that even though there is ingroup favoritism in the sense that participants in 
both treatments cooperate slightly more with those of the same color, this is not what is driving 
the quota effect.  
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A second set of theories is related to entitlement and punishment. Entitlement is a key concept in 
the literature on procedural fairness, and it has been shown that an experimental participant who 
earns an endowment in an experiment is less inclined to share those resources with others than if 
the endowment was randomly obtained (Hoffman et al., 1996; Cherry, 2001; Oxoby and 
Spraggon, 2008). Similarly, we also know that people are willing to punish those who behave in 
a non-approved way or who get undeserved benefits (see e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000; and Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004). In this case, it is not implausible that those who were not advantaged by 
the quota could feel an entitlement to more resources or a willingness to punish those who were 
advantaged by the preferential treatment. This could then give rise to the quota effect, i.e. less 
cooperation in the unrepresentative quota treatment compared to the control treatment.  
 
The results that we observe in the experiment are, however, inconsistent with these mechanisms. 
If punishment were the main underlying factor behind the quota effect, we should not see an ef-
fect of the quota when those who were not advantaged by the quota, i.e. the orange participants, 
play with others of the same color. A feeling of entitlement induced by the quota treatment 
should on the other hand not make a difference in the case when the advantaged, i.e. purple, 
participants play with each other. As we observe a quota effect of similar size regardless of the 
participant’s own color and that of the matched player, it can be concluded that the effect is not 
driven primarily by punishment or entitlement.  
 
Third, it may be that (perceived) competence matters for the quota effect. Previous research has 
shown that affirmative action has a negative impact on how the competence of the selected per-
son is viewed both by himself and by others (see e.g. Garcia et al., 1981; Heilman et al., 1987, 
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1992). There are two ways that the performance in our experiment could matter for the quota ef-
fect. On the one hand, there may be an inherent relation between how many math problems an 
individual can solve and how she behaves in a social dilemma. Second, there is the question of 
how participants view one another’s competence and what beliefs they hold about whether there 
is a relationship between math task solving ability and cooperative behavior.19 
 
Returning to the results of the experiment, Section 3.3 above concluded that the quota effect is 
not driven by an inherent relationship between performance in the math task and behavior in the 
public good game. It can also be concluded that beliefs about competence are not the main driver 
of the quota effect, as this should not give rise to a symmetric quota effect, regardless of the 
color-match of the players, which is what we observe. 
 
1.4.2 A General Quota Effect 
There are also theories and previous research indicating that the quota effect should be general, 
i.e. affecting all relations within the group. We’ll look at two strands of such research.  
 
First, some previous work on affirmative action has focused on how preferential selection im-
pacts people’s general sense of interest and motivation and it has been found that when some 
employees or team members are selected using affirmative action, motivation, interest and social 
interactions can be negatively affected. Most importantly, this is true for both those who are ad-
vantaged and for those who are disadvantaged by the preferential selection (Chacko, 1982; 
Heilman et al., 1987, 1996. See also McFarlin and Sweeney, 1991). 
                                                 
19 See Rustichini et al., 2011, Benjamin et al., forthcoming and Mollerstrom and Seim, 2012 for examples of papers 
discussing the link between cognitive ability and cooperative (and other-regarding) behavior.  
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Second, in the procedural justice literature, a just process is regarded as a source of social moti-
vation, i.e. it is believed to increase cooperative behavior (Tyler and Lind, 1992; Tyler and De 
Cremer, 2006). This has been found in several contexts including law compliance (Tyler, 1990) 
and organizational citizenship behavior (Tepper and Taylor, 2003). Moreover, this effect has 
been shown both in the case where the outcome following the procedure was one that was favor-
able to the agents, and in the case where the outcome was unfavorable (see Tyler, 2003; Tyler 
and Huo, 2002; Zapata-Phelan, 2009; Holmvall and Bobocel, 2008). 
 
The finding that there is a quota effect for both those who were disadvantaged and those who 
were advantaged by the quota, and that the effect is of similar size regardless of which of these 
two groups the matched player belongs to, is in line with the above findings of a general impact 
of procedures on behavior.20  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
Affirmative action and quotas are widely used policies that are often successful in achieving de-
sired numerical representations. However, there are also many anecdotal examples of unwanted 
negative side effects in the form of uncooperative and inefficient behavior in the groups that are 
formed with quotas. I conduct a laboratory experiment in order to investigate whether it is indeed 
                                                 
20 Neither the procedural justice research nor the psychology literature about affirmative action has much to say 
regarding the exact mechanism that underlies the decrease in motivation, interest and cooperativeness that follows in 
the wake of unjust procedures. These results could, however, be related to the growing literature on how moods and 
emotions impact economic decision-making. It has for example been shown that people who feel anger are less 
other-regarding and cooperative, see e.g. van Kleef et al., 2004; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; and Small and Lerner, 
2008. One way to further deepen our understanding about why the quota effect arises in our experiment would be to 
utilize measures of emotions and moods. By using Likert-type scales, physiological measures or other tools, it would 
be possible to understand if particular emotions, such as anger or annoyance, lie behind the quota effect. See Coan et 
al. (2007) for an overview of the literature on emotion elicitation and assessment. 
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the case that groups put together by an unrepresentative quota cooperate less than groups where 
everyone is treated symmetrically and selected by performance.  
 
I create groups by randomly allocating colors to participants. In the unrepresentative quota 
treatment, I create a selected group by automatically admitting all participants of one color 
whereas participants of the other color are chosen in competition with each other, based on their 
performance in a previous task. Cooperation is measured as the level of contribution in a two-
person public good game and I compare the level of cooperation in the unrepresentative quota 
treatment to a control treatment where participants of the two colors are treated symmetrically 
and everyone is chosen by performance.  
 
The results show significantly less cooperation in the unrepresentative quota treatment and I 
furthermore find that this effect arises both for the players who were advantaged and those who 
were not advantaged by the quota. The unrepresentative quota also has the same negative effect 
on cooperation regardless of the color of the other player. These results contradict the predictions 
of some prominent theories, for example that the disadvantaged will punish the advantaged.  
 
Furthermore I find that the level of cooperation remains low in the group that is put together by 
the unrepresentative quota even when a justification is given for the preferential selection. How-
ever, the negative effect of the quota on cooperation goes away when the selection criteria for the 
selected group is changed from performance-based to random, i.e. by removing selection by 
performance entirely, the quota effect can be turned off. This implies that the quota effect is tied 
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to the fact that the participants who are admitted into the selected group under the unrepresenta-
tive quota are chosen by different criteria.  
 
There are several potential policy implications of these findings. For example, the fact that the 
unrepresentative quota affects all relationships in the group – not only those between the disad-
vantaged and the advantaged – can potentially make negative effects of affirmative action harder 
to detect. In organizations where affirmative action or quotas are used one often looks for differ-
ences in how people treat one another as an indication of negative effects of the policy. If no 
such differences are found, the conclusion may mistakenly be that all is well, even though the 
behavior in all relations in the group may be negatively affected by the policy.  
 
Another policy lesson is that there is a difference between paying lip service to a policy and be-
having in accordance with its intentions. When I introduce a fairness reason for the quota, par-
ticipants move toward finding the unrepresentative quota to be more fair; in fact they find the 
selection process as fair as in the control treatment. However, they do not change their coopera-
tive behavior but continue to contribute as little in the public good game as when no justification 
is given. This indicates that even though people may state that they find a policy to be justified or 
fair, its negative impact on behavior may persist.  
 
Naturally, many laboratory findings may not translate into other settings. In group interactions 
outside the laboratory, for example on corporate boards, in schools and in the workplace, there 
are additional factors which are not captured in the laboratory. An example is the fact that rela-
tions outside the laboratory are generally of a longer duration. Also, in practice affirmative action 
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policies are applied to groups of people who already have associations and prejudices attached to 
them. This may play a role in how a particular quota is perceived. However, the fact that this ex-
periment shows an effect from preferential selection also in the abstract, short-lived and 
“stripped down” environment of the laboratory is an indication that this effect can arise also 
under minimal conditions and is thus potentially strong.  
 
As the use of affirmative action policies and quotas spreads in many parts of the world, it is im-
portant to understand their effects on how groups function. This chapter is a contribution to that 
research, but many questions remain unanswered. It would, for example, be interesting to con-
duct a version of our experiment in which measures of emotions and moods are utilized in order 
to investigate more specifically the effects that the unrepresentative quota have on participants.  
 
Small alterations to the design used in this chapter would also make it possible to answer ques-
tions about whether an asymmetric role of performance in itself causes less cooperation, or if it is 
that asymmetry together with preferential treatment that gives rise to the quota effect. Finally, in 
order to better assess the generality and external validity of these findings, it would be interesting 
to examine other group compositions than the ones used here; would the results change if the un-
derlying group consisted of, for example, five purples and eleven oranges instead of four and 
twelve respectively? In order to better understand the way affirmative action and quotas impact 
group cooperation, I plan to address these, and other, topics in future work.  
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2. Social Framing Effects: Preferences or Beliefs?21 
2.1 Introduction 
In a seminal experiment, Deutsch (1958) showed that behavior in a Prisoners’ dilemma depends 
on whether experimental subjects are induced to feel cooperative or individualistic before mak-
ing their choice. While Deutsch’s instructions were heavily loaded,22 it has long been clear that 
subtler contextual manipulations may also affect behavior. Eiser and Bhavnani (1974) find that 
behavior in a Prisoners’ dilemma is more cooperative when the situation is framed as an interna-
tional negotiation than when it is framed as a business transaction. Likewise, subjects cooperate 
more in a “social exchange study” than in a “business transaction study” (Batson and Moran, 
1999), and substantially more in a “community game” than in a “Wall Street game” (Kay and 
Ross, 2003; Liberman, Samuels, and Ross, 2004), even when the subjects’ instructions are oth-
erwise neutral.23  
                                                 
21 This is joint work with Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson and Sara Munkhammar. The paper appeared in 
Games and Economic Behavior, 76: 117-130. 
22 According to Deutsch (1960), in the cooperative condition, the beginning of the instruction was: “Before you start 
playing the game, let me emphasize that in playing the game you should consider yourself to be partners. You’re 
interested in your partner’s welfare as well as in your own.” In the individualistic condition, the beginning of the 
instruction instead was: “Before you start playing the game, let me emphasize that in playing the game your only 
motivation should be to win as much money as you can for yourself. You have no interest whatsoever in whether the 
other person wins or loses or in how much he wins or loses.” 
23 From now on, we use the term social frame in the narrow sense of “the name of the game” – the labeling of the 
situation. Other studies that investigate the impact of game labels or strategy labels in social dilemmas include, inter 
alia, Andreoni (1995), Brandts and Schwieren (2009), Brewer and Kramer (1986), Cookson (2000), Cubitt, 
Drouvelis, and Gächter (2011), Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt (2011), McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991), 
McCusker and Carnevale (1995), Meier (2006), Pillutla and Chen (1999), Rege and Telle (2004), Sell and Son 
(1997), van Dijk and Wilke (2000), and Zhong, Loewenstein, and Murnighan (2007). Labels have also been shown 
to affect cooperative behavior in other games; see for example Larrick and Blount (1997) and Barr and Serra (2009). 
Whereas we are only concerned with the effect of labeling on cooperation in social situations, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) (who coined the “framing effect” concept) showed that wording can have a significant impact on 
individual choice as well; see Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) for a survey of individual choice effects of 
wording. 
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Such context sensitivity has been interpreted as bad news for utility theory in general (Weber, 
Kopelman, and Messick, 2004) and for social preference theories in particular (Levitt and List, 
2007). To the extent that people can be seen as maximizing utility at all, it appears that the utility 
function must include situational elements that conventional theory leaves out. At a more practi-
cal level, the results have been used to criticize economists’ emphasis on material incentives. By 
triggering a selfish social frame, material incentives could potentially reduce, for example, em-
ployee effort (Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Pfeffer, 2007), legal compliance (Tyran and Feld, 2006; 
Bohnet and Cooter, 2001), and other prosocial behaviors (Koneberg, Yaish, and Stocké, 2010). 
Through this channel, the very language and assumptions of economics could be eroding cooper-
ation (Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton, 2005). 
 
However, the lessons from the experimental findings are less obvious than they may first appear. 
The social framing results have several possible explanations, and additional evidence is needed 
to discriminate between them. As Camerer (2003, p. 75) puts it: “There is little doubt that de-
scribing games differently can affect behavior; the key step is figuring out what general princi-
ples (or theory of framing) can be abstracted from labeling effects.” Our purpose here is to pro-
vide new evidence that helps to elucidate these general principles. 
 
It is possible to distinguish at least three broad classes of social framing theories. The first class 
posits that frames affect internalized social norms or, alternatively, social preferences:24 This 
would mean that the Community label triggers a stronger desire or compulsion to cooperate 
                                                 
24 Social norms are defined on the set of social situations (i.e., game forms; see below), whereas social preferences 
are typically defined on some set of ultimate outcomes. 
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(Montgomery, 1998; Weber, Kopelman, and Messick, 2004). We call this the variable sociality 
hypothesis.  
 
Bacharach (2006) provides a formal treatment of the variable sociality hypothesis for a particular 
case of internalized social norms, namely team reasoning.25 An alternative formalization, involv-
ing a smaller departure from conventional game theory, is to assume that certain decision frames 
affect social preferences, such as altruism. In this case, a Prisoners’ dilemma in material payoffs 
may be transformed into, for example, a common interest game in utilities. More precisely, the 
game form (which summarizes the objective features of strategies and payoffs) is a Prisoners’ 
dilemma, but the game (which involves von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities) is not.26  
 
Another hypothesis is that people respond to social frames because the frame affects how others 
interpret their behavior, which in turn determines their social esteem. Even a person who has not 
internalized norms, and who holds strictly selfish preferences, may want to appear to be 
prosocial. This is the social image hypothesis.27 
 
A third class of theories of social framing effects is that the frame affects the expectations that 
people have about each other’s behavior, and these expectations in turn affect the own behavior. 
                                                 
25 Roughly, when a person engages in team reasoning, she asks which strategy profile is best for the group and picks 
her component of that profile; see Sugden (1993, 2003) and Bacharach (1999, 2006). The theory comes in several 
flavors; Bacharach considers unconditional norm compliance, whereas Sugden (2003) emphasizes that compliance 
may be conditional on the belief that others comply as well.  
26 The term “game form” originates from Gibbard (1973, p. 587), and is used synonymously with “mechanism” in 
the mechanism design literature. It is a description of the link between strategies and outcomes. Utility functions, in 
turn, link outcomes to real numbers (utilities). 
27 There is a sizeable literature documenting that people are motivated by social esteem considerations; see for 
example Brennan and Pettit (2004), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) and the 
references therein.  
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For this theory to apply in a Prisoners’ dilemma, it is necessary that people care not only about 
their own material payoffs, but also about others’ actions (Sen, 1967), intentions (Rabin, 1993) 
or material payoffs (Becker, 1974; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), in which case a Prisoners’ dilemma 
in material payoffs may be transformed into a “Stag hunt” in utilities. Since a Stag hunt game has 
two pure strategy Nash equilibria, the frame can be used as an equilibrium selection device, as 
noted by Rabin (1998) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006). At the outset, we lump together all these 
models that are based on multiple equilibria and refer to them as the coordination hypothesis.   
 
In order to evaluate the relative importance of the three hypotheses, we first state them formally. 
We then report three separate one-shot Prisoners’ dilemma experiments, in which we systemati-
cally vary features of the game. The first experiment replicates the main finding of previous 
studies, namely the presence of framing effects in a simultaneous Prisoners’ dilemma. It also 
shows that this finding is difficult to explain with some versions of the variable sociality hypoth-
esis. The second experiment evaluates the social image hypothesis, which finds no support in the 
data. The third experiment considers framing effects in sequential Prisoners’ dilemmas. It finds 
none. 
 
In our view, the most striking finding is that there is indeed a significant social framing effect 
when subjects make their decisions simultaneously, as in our first experiment, but not when deci-
sions are made sequentially, as in our third experiment.28 This finding is consistent with the 
coordination hypothesis, but inconsistent with the variable sociality hypothesis. Briefly, the 
argument runs as follows: Because a sequential Stag hunt game has a unique subgame perfect 
                                                 
28 It would have been even better to have data from one experiment in which framing effects under simultaneous and 
sequential play is compared directly. We return to this and other caveats in the two final sections. 
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equilibrium, there is no room for a coordinating role of labels. On the other hand, team reasoning 
or altruism should affect behavior regardless of whether moves are simultaneous or sequential. 
Our findings thus suggest that framing effects in social dilemmas are well explained within the 
modern version of the rational choice paradigm, without any appeal to context-dependent prefer-
ences. (As we shall see, one caveat is that the beliefs themselves could be involving some notion 
that opponents have – or expect their opponents to have etc – context dependent preferences.) 
 
The research described in this chapter is most closely related to Liberman, Samuels, and Ross 
(2004), whose results were circulated already in the early 1990’s. They report on three studies. 
The first study compares behavior in a seven-round Prisoners’ dilemma under a “Wall Street 
Game” frame to the corresponding behavior under a “Community Game” frame, using a selected 
group of 48 male college students.29 The second study instead uses 40 Israeli pilot trainees, and 
the labels Bursa Game and Kommuna Game, but is otherwise similar. In both studies, coopera-
tion rates are significantly higher under the Community/Kommuna Game frame. In the second 
study, both the pilot trainees themselves and their (flight) instructors are asked to make predic-
tions about others’ first-round behavior. On average, the participants are more optimistic re-
garding others’ cooperation in the Kommuna Game than in the Bursa Game, but no such differ-
ence is observed among instructors. Moreover, participants expecting first-round cooperation are 
relatively likely to cooperate in the Kommuna Game, but not in the Bursa Game.30 Finally, in the 
third study, college students who had not participated in Study 1 were asked to predict first-
                                                 
29 One purpose of the study was to compare the influence of the social context with that of presumed personality 
characteristics. The subjects had been chosen by peers based on their likely propensity to cooperate. 
30 If the game had been one-shot, the latter difference would clearly have suggested that preferences depend on 
frames. However, here it might instead reflect different expectations about behavior in later rounds.  
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round choices. Like the flight instructors in Study 2, these subjects failed to predict the large 
difference in cooperation rates between the two frames, suggesting that beliefs depend on 
whether one is a participant in the situation or not.  
 
Besides involving a much larger number of subjects, and hence having more statistical power, 
our experiments provide qualitatively new insights. First, by considering a one-shot Prisoners’ 
dilemma, we narrow down the set of explanations:31 We rule out the possible objection that even 
selfish materialists could find it in their interest to cooperate in the first round of a finitely re-
peated game, either because of uncertainty about the opponent’s type (Kreps et al, 1982) or be-
cause the payoff loss from one round’s cooperation is small enough to neglect (Radner, 1986). 
Second, and more importantly, we use variation in available strategies and information to dis-
criminate between different explanations for social framing effects. Liberman, Samuels, and 
Ross (2004) cannot rule out the possibility that the frame’s primary effect is on the preferences, 
and that beliefs only change as a result of the preference change. Our evidence suggests that the 
social frame only affects behavior through the beliefs, and not through preferences. (Of course, 
even if they are not affected by the frame, preferences are still important in our analysis, since 
they determine whether beliefs matter for behavior to begin with.) 
 
Other closely related experimental studies include Cookson (2000) and Rege and Telle (2004), 
who study social framing effects in public goods contribution games. Both these papers find that 
a more community oriented frame creates more cooperation, although in the latter study the ef-
                                                 
31 Cubitt, Drouvelis, and Gächter (2011) provide further reasons for studying framing effects in one-shot games.  
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fect is only marginally statistically significant, probably due to a small number of subjects per 
treatment.32  
 
We are not the first to utilize a sequential Prisoners’ dilemma to disentangle preferences and be-
liefs. In a study of in-group favoritism Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) find that there is more in-
group favoritism in Prisoners’ dilemmas with simultaneous play than in games with sequential 
play.33 Although Yamagishi and Kiyonari do not explicitly invoke the game theoretic argument, 
it is clear that their idea is similar to ours: They interpret the sharp reduction of in-group favorit-
ism in the sequential setting as an indication that the in-group favoritism in the simultaneous set-
ting is driven primarily by expectations, not preferences. However, Yamagishi and Kiyonari only 
study the behavior of first-movers, whereas our strongest evidence comes from the absence of a 
framing effect among second movers in the sequential game.  
 
Our findings also relate quite closely to Bohnet and Cooter (2001), who experimentally compare 
the behavioral impact of small penalties across different game forms. They find little effect of 
penalties in a many-player Prisoners’ dilemma, but large effects in a coordination game. A natu-
ral interpretation is that the small penalties for defection from socially optimal actions moved the 
beliefs in a favorable direction, and that such movement only matters in a coordination game. 
However, as we point out, one cannot from looking at material payoffs alone infer what the real 
                                                 
32 Note however that two recent studies, Brandts and Schwieren (2009) and  Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-
Schmidt (2010), report similar experiments that fail to establish the expected framing effect. In the latter, it turns out 
that there is a natural explanation – the particular subjects’ negative view of their own community – but in the for-
mer there is no obvious reason for the lack of a framing effect. 
33 In-group favoritism refers to the phenomenon that people behave more favorably toward members of the own 
group than toward non-members. We refer to Chen and Li (2009) for an extensive review and experimental evalua-
tion of in-group favoritism.  
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game is; for two conditional cooperators, the Prisoners dilemma game form is a coordination 
game. Thus, the above natural interpretation requires an independent argument for why material 
payoffs and utilities are likely to coincide in this case. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly discusses the different theories. Section 
2.3 describes our first study, which establishes both that social framing effects exist and that they 
can be removed by suitable manipulations of the environment. More precisely, the study shows 
that the framing effect vanishes when the opponent is unaware of what game is being played and 
the opponent’s action is controlled by a suitably programmed computer. The second study, re-
ported in Section 2.4, shows that the framing effect remains absent under otherwise similar cir-
cumstances even if the opponent is informed, a finding which goes against the notion that people 
cooperate in the Community Game in order to impress their opponent with their altruism. The 
third and final study, reported in Section 2.5, shows that there is no framing effect in the sequen-
tial Prisoners’ dilemma. Section 2.6 discusses some caveats and concludes. 
 
2.2 Theory 
Consider two players facing the actions and material payoffs (the game form) depicted in Figure 
2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: Material Payoffs – the Game Form 
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Let ݓ ൐ ܿ ൐ ݀ ൐ ݏ. Moreover, let ݏ ൅ ݓ ൏ 2ܿ. Thus, the sum of the material payoffs is largest if 
both players choose action C. However, if the players are selfish materialists, they will both be 
playing D, since D maximizes the own material payoff regardless of what the opponent does. 
That is, the game form in Figure 2.1 is a Prisoners’ dilemma. The action labels are chosen to 
indicate Cooperation and Defection, respectively, and the letters for the payoff parameters c and 
d are chosen accordingly. In line with the classical treatments of the Prisoners’ dilemma, the let-
ters s and w indicate the “sucker” payoff and the “winner” payoff respectively. 
 
From now on, we say that a player is selfish if she cares only about the own material payoff. All 
other player types are considered to be unselfish to some degree. 
 
We introduce the following pieces of notation. Let ௜ܵ א ሼܥ, ܦሽ be a pure action for player i and 
let ݉௜൫ ௜ܵ, ௝ܵ൯ א Թ  be player i’s material payoff given the strategy profile ൫ ௜ܵ, ௝ܵ൯. Players may 
care about the opponent’s payoff too, that is, they may have social preferences, or they may have 
a view about what is the right course of action in a certain situation, that is, they may care about 
social norms.  
 
Players may also care about non-material outcomes, such as the opponent’s belief about their 
social preferences. To capture such preferences, let T be a finite set of possible player types, with 
τ as a typical element; let ߬௜௝ denote player i’s expectation about player j’s type; and let ௝߬௜௘  de-
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note player i’s expectation about ௝߬௜.
34 Finally, let F denote the set of frames, with typical ele-
ment F. In general, player i’s utility can thus be written as a function ௜ܷ൫݉௜, ௝݉ , ߬, ߬௜௝, ߬௜௝௘ , ܨ൯. 
 
Below, we consider some specific examples of how the frame may enter players’ preferences 
and beliefs respectively. In most of the examples, we abstract from preference heterogeneity in 
the interest of simplicity. With heterogeneous preferences, we would have to employ different 
solution concepts, using the theory of games with incomplete information. In the fifth model 
considered below, we admit heterogeneity and also briefly indicate how insights from the com-
plete information models are robust to (some) preference heterogeneity.  
 
2.2.1 Frame-Dependent Preferences 
The frame could be directly affecting the degree of unselfishness. Suppose players are altruists, 
but that their altruism depends on the frame F. Specifically, let each player i assign utility 
ߙሺܨሻ ௝݉ to the opponent’s material payoff ௝݉. That is, utility can be written 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ݉௜ ൅ ߙሺܨሻ ௝݉. (1) 
 
Suppose these preferences are common knowledge. The game corresponding to the game form in 
Figure 2.1 is then given by the bi-matrix depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
                                                 
34 For early formal models of social esteem concerns, see Bernheim (1994), Ireland (1994) and Glazer and Konrad 
(1996). For recent extensions and applications, see Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson 
(2008).  Experimental evidence suggests that people care about what others think about their actions even if the 
interaction itself is anonymous; see Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006), Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), and 
Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2012). Beliefs may affect preferences also in a model without “types” – see 
Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig Schmidt (2010) for references and an application to framing effects. 
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Figure 2.2: The Game Played by Frame-Sensitive Altruists 
 
 
If players are sufficiently altruistic, the game is not a Prisoners’ dilemma. For example, if 
ߙ ൐ ݉ܽݔሼሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺܿ െ ݏሻ, ሺ݀ െ ݏሻ/ሺݓ െ ݀ሻሽ, each player’s dominant choice is to play the 
cooperative action C, whereas action D remains dominant if ߙ ൏ ݉݅݊ሼሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺܿ െ ݏሻ, ሺ݀ െ
ݏ/ݓെ݀. (For intermediate values of α, we have that the game is Stag hunt if 
ሺ݀ െ ݏሻ/ሺݓ െ ݀ሻ ൐ ሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺܿ െ ݏሻ, and Chicken if ሺ݀ െ ݏሻ/ሺݓ െ ݀ሻ ൏ ሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺܿ െ ݏሻ. 
 
Team reasoning, at least in the sense of Bacharach (2006), can be seen as an internalized social 
norm that requires players to unconditionally pick the strategy profile that is consistent with joint 
payoff maximization, here ሺܥ, ܥሻ.35 For the purposes of our study, team reasoning thus yields the 
same behavior as an altruism parameter ߙ ൐ ݉ܽݔሼሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺܿ െ ݏሻ, ሺ݀ െ ݏሻ/ሺݓ െ ݀ሻሽ.36 In-
deed, perhaps the most natural interpretation of the players’ altruistic concern ߙሺܨሻ is that they 
have internalized an efficiency norm, not that they care strongly about the opponent’s life-time 
consumption.37 Observe that beliefs about the opponent are irrelevant whenever a player has a 
dominant action. Thus, even if players are heterogeneous, differing with respect to their propen-
                                                 
35 Sugden (2003) proposes a theory of team reasoning in which players only want to stick to the norm  if they expect 
opponents to do so too. This model of expectation formation entails coordination on efficient equilibria in common 
interest games. 
36 As noted by Sugden, 2008, there is always such correspondence between team reasoning and linear social prefer-
ences when the game is decomposable; however, for non-decomposable games the correspondence breaks down. 
37 See, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), Krupka and Weber (2009), and especially López--Pérez (2008) for different 
models of norm compliance. 
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sity to comply with norms, the belief about the opponent’s propensity does not enter into the de-
cision problem. 
 
If people obtain more utility from obeying the efficiency norm when the game form is called a 
“Community Game” than when it is called a “Stock Market Game,” the propensity to play C will 
tend to be higher in the former case. For an economist, this is perhaps the most straightforward 
formalization of the variable sociality hypothesis. 
 
The social esteem hypothesis instead says that people are concerned about what others may think 
about them. For example, a player may get positive utility from believing that the opponent be-
lieves that she is altruistic (or obeys the efficiency norm). Formally, player i’s belief about player 
j’s belief will then enter player i’s utility function. For example, suppose that each player is ei-
ther selfish ሺ߬ ൌ 0ሻ or altruistic ൫߬ ൌ ߙሺܨሻ൯, and that players’ desire for social esteem is 
independent of their actual altruism, but possibly dependent on the frame. Then player i’s utility 
function can be written 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ݉௜ ൅ ߙሺܨሻ ௝݉ ൅ ݒ൫ߙ௝௜௘ ሺ ௜ܵ, ܨሻ, ܨ൯. (2) 
 
For simplicity, assume that ݒሺ0, ܨሻ ൌ 0 ൏ ݒሺߙ, ܨሻ for all ߙ ൐ 0 and any frame F – that is, 
selfishness is never a source of esteem. Note here that the opponent’s ex post belief, and hence 
one’s esteem, may depend on the own action. In general, the frame could affect both the oppo-
nent’s interpretation (and hence be an argument of ߙ௝௜௘ ) and the utility of the opponent’s belief – 
it’s more valuable to be considered unselfish in a community setting (and hence appear as an 
independent argument of v). 
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With these preferences, the Prisoners’ dilemma turns into a (two-sided) signaling problem, in 
which players may cooperate not only because they are altruistic, but also in order to convey the 
impression that they are altruistic. If the value of looking altruistic, ݒ൫ߙ௝௜௘ , ܨ൯, is greater under 
one frame than another, then this hypothesis works in essentially the same way as the variable 
sociality hypothesis.38 However, since only the social esteem considerations are affected by 
external observability it is still possible to distinguish between the two hypotheses. 
 
2.2.2 Frame-Dependent Beliefs 
Let us next consider models in which frames do not enter preferences, but may be entering be-
liefs instead. If the game has multiple equilibria, the frame may then affect equilibrium selection. 
There are a variety of social preferences that transform a Prisoners’ dilemma game form into a 
game with multiple equilibria. 
 
Suppose first that players desire to behave altruistically if and only if their material payoff is no 
smaller than that of the opponent. That is, their utility function takes the form 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ݉௜ ൅ ߙܫ ௝݉, (3) 
where I is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if ݉௜ ൒ ௝݉ and 0 otherwise.39 Then, if prefer-
ences are common knowledge, the game is as depicted in Figure 2.3. 
 
                                                 
38 More formally, there will be an open set of parameters such that, in the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium that 
satisfies the Intuitive Criterion, the altruists play C under one frame, but D under the other. (Egoists play D under 
either frame.) 
39 The key to our analysis is that altruism is greater when players are ahead, not that it vanishes completely when 
they are behind. However, this formulation is particularly simple. See Charness and Rabin, 2002, for a detailed dis-
cussion of the relevance of such social welfare preferences. 
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Figure 2.3: The Game with Altruism Towards a Worse off Opponent 
 
If ߙ ൐ ሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺܿ െ ݏሻ, the game has two pure strategy equilibria, namely ሺܥ, ܥሻ and ሺܦ, ܦሻ, 
where the former equilibrium Pareto-dominates the latter. That is, the game is not Prisoners’ 
dilemma, but Stag hunt.40  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this kind of argument was first made by Sen (1967). However, Sen 
invoked the concept of “conditional cooperation,” which is a general description of preferences 
over alternative actions in the specific situation of a social dilemma rather than a specific prefer-
ence ordering over a general set of outcomes. As is well known, there are many other general 
preference orderings over outcomes that may also give rise to “conditional cooperation” in social 
dilemmas. 
 
For example, as noted by Fehr and Schmidt (2006), an analogous argument holds if both players 
dislike “taking advantage of” their opponent. (Many people dislike even more to be taken ad-
vantage of, but for the current argument it is only the aversion to advantageous inequality that 
matters.) Specifically, suppose that players’ utility can be written 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ݉௜ െ ߚ݉ܽݔ൛0, ݉௜ െ ௝݉ൟ. (4) 
Then, if the utilities are common knowledge, the corresponding game is depicted in Figure 2.4. 
  
                                                 
40 We here employ a broad definition of Stag hunt. A narrower definition would admit only games in which (D,D) is 
risk-dominant. In our example, this condition is fulfilled if s is sufficiently small. 
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Figure 2.4: The Game when Players are Averse to Advantageous Inequality 
 
If ߚ ൐ ሺݓ െ ܿሻ/ሺݓ െ ݏሻ, the game is Stag hunt, with pure strategy equilibria ሺܥ, ܥሻ and ሺܦ, ܦሻ. 
 
There are several other versions of the above argument, including the conditional fairness model 
of López-Pérez (2008) as well as the intention-based fairness model of Rabin (1993). Taking 
inspiration from the theory and findings of Charness and Rabin (2002), here is one model that we 
like particularly well, and which will also turn out to rationalize our data. Suppose there are two 
types of players, egoists and conditional altruists with the utility function 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ݉௜ ൅ ߙܫߙ௜௝ ௝݉, (5) 
where I is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if ݉௜ ൒ ௝݉ and 0 otherwise. That is, altruism 
is only triggered when the opponent is behind and is not believed to be an egoist. Then, if ߙ௜௝ and 
ߙ are sufficiently large, the resulting incomplete information game has two pure strategy Bayes-
ian Nash equilibria – one in which conditional altruists play C and one in which they play D. 
Egoists, of course, always play D. 
 
When the game has multiple equilibria, as in models (2)-(5), it is a short step to see that the 
frame can be used as a coordination device, indicating a focal point (Schelling, 1960). Moreover, 
in order for the frame to have an effect on the agents’ behavior, it is not necessary to assume that 
preferences change. Instead, since the social frame only affects beliefs, this approach is fully 
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compatible with the view that models of preferences ought to be parsimonious and portable 
across games.41  
 
The notion that frames affect coordination is more than a theoretical possibility. There is sub-
stantial evidence that people use action labels for coordination purposes; see Mehta, Starmer, and 
Sugden (1994) and Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008). A formal model of how this 
may happen has been developed by Bacharach (1993) and refined through the notion of level-k 
reasoning by Bacharach and Stahl (2000); see also Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) and 
Bardsley et al (2010). 42 
 
Such a level-k model can also be used to rationalize the impact of the game label, as opposed to 
action labels, on behavior. Roughly, if a level-1 player i thinks that player j (if not selfish), is 
attracted towards joint payoff maximizing actions under the Community label but towards pri-
vate payoff maximizing actions under the Stock Market label, then player i, if conditionally co-
operative for either of the reasons specified above, will also cooperate under the Community 
label but not under the Stock Market label. 
 
2.3 The First Study: Presence and Absence of Framing Effects 
The first experiment was conducted at Södertörn University College and Stockholm School of 
Economics, both in Stockholm, Sweden, on three different occasions. The first sessions were run 
                                                 
41 For a discussion of the trade-off between fit and parsimony in the modeling of people’s preferences, see Sobel 
(2005). 
42 Cachon and Camerer (1996) and Rydval and Ortman (2005) demonstrate that loss aversion furnishes another, and 
possibly related, coordination principle.  
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at Södertörn in April 2006. Subsequent sessions were run at Södertörn in November 2006 and at 
the Stockholm School of Economics in September 2007. On each occasion the subjects were 
randomly allocated between four treatments. 
 
In total 448 subjects participated as decision-makers in the experiment. All were freshmen en-
rolled in a basic microeconomics course. In addition, 220 student subjects participated as recipi-
ents in the asymmetric information treatment (described below). 
 
Two of the treatments are intended to investigate whether we can replicate previous findings of 
social framing effects within an experiment that satisfies current requirements in behavioral 
economics. Specifically, the sample size is large, real money is at stake and each subject is ex-
posed only to one decision frame. Moreover the social framing is quite light; the name of the 
game differs across treatments, but otherwise the description of the situation is neutral. 
The other two treatments are designed to test whether it is possible to reduce or eliminate any 
framing effects, by manipulating several features of the situation. This is described in detail be-
low. 
 
2.3.1 Design 
In treatments 1 and 2, henceforth called the symmetric information treatments, subjects are 
seated in four different rooms. Each subject is, anonymously and randomly, paired with a subject 
in another room, and both subjects receive identical oral and written instructions. Indeed, with 
the exception of the name of the game, all subjects in treatments 1 and 2 receive identically 
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worded instructions. In one pair of rooms, the situation is called the Stock Market Game (treat-
ment 1); in the other pair of rooms, it is called the Community Game (treatment 2). 
 
The paired subjects simultaneously choose between two options, denoted A and B respectively. If 
both subjects choose option A, each earns 50 SEK43 (Swedish Kronor; $1≈SEK 7.50 at the time 
of the experiment). If both subjects choose option B, each earns SEK 20. If one subject chooses 
option A and the other subject chooses option B, the former earns SEK 5 and the latter earns SEK 
80. The associated game form is depicted in Figure 2.5.  
 
Figure 2.5: The Game Form in the Experiment 
 
 
Since each subject earns more by choosing B than by choosing A, and the pair of actions ሺܤ, ܤሻ 
yields lower payoffs for both subjects than the pair ሺܣ, ܣሻ, and the total payoff from ሺܣ, ܤሻ or 
ሺܤ, ܣሻ is lower than from ሺܣ, ܣሻ the situation is a true Prisoners’ dilemma. Indeed, the game 
form is a special case of that in Figure 2.1, but with the letters A and B replacing C and D. In all 
experiments, we used letters A and B in order to minimize the risk that any of our subjects would 
associate the labels with particular meanings, such as cooperation and defection. However, for 
ease of reference, we now revert to using letters C and D in the current text. 
 
                                                 
43 In April 2006, USD 1= SEK 7.6. At the time of the following experiments the krona’s exchange rate is slightly 
better, with the krona hitting its highest value against the dollar (USD 1= SEK 6.7) in September 2008 and Septem-
ber 2009.  
61 
 
In treatments 3 and 4, henceforth called the asymmetric information treatments, only one person 
in each pair was in control of the own decision. These decision-making subjects were given oral 
and written instructions that differed from the ones given in treatments 1 and 2 only with respect 
to the matched subject’s choice. The matched subject was explained to be an uninformed re-
ceiver, whose action is chosen by a computer. The computer would make the opponent’s action 
choices with the same frequencies as actual play in the corresponding active opponent treatment. 
Only information regarding the procedure was given to the decision-maker, and not the actual 
frequency. The instructions for treatments 3 and 4 were identical except for the name of the 
game, which was the Stock Market Game in treatment 3 and the Community Game in treatment 
4. The receivers were given written information that they were taking part in an economic ex-
periment, but received no information about why they received a specific payoff. 
 
After the experiment, the participants received information about their matched subject’s action 
and were paid accordingly. Appendices B.1 and B.2 contain translations of the complete experi-
mental instructions.  
 
2.3.2 Predictions 
Let models be indexed by the equation number of the corresponding utility function. All the 
models reviewed above allow the outcome that there is more cooperation in treatment 2 (stand-
ard Community Game) than in treatment 1 (standard Stock Market Game). However, they differ 
substantially regarding their predictions regarding treatments 3 and 4.  
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If we take the game label to be the frame, and under the assumption that beliefs are really the 
same in T3 (T4) as in T1 (T2), then Model (1) predicts that the behavior is the same in T3 as in 
T1, and the same in T4 as in T2. Thus, the framing effect ought to be the same when comparing 
T3 and T4 as when comparing T1 and T2.  
Model (3) and Model (4), predict that behavior in T3 (T4) is identical to that in T1 (T2) under the 
sole condition that beliefs are the same in T3 as in T1 and in T4 as in T2. According to these two 
models it only matters what the opponent ends up doing, not what she knows or wants. Thus, 
subjects should disregard whether their opponent is active or passive, informed or uninformed. 
 
Model (2) allows behavior to depend on the opponent’s information. If anything, there should be 
more cooperation in T1 than in T3, as social esteem is only at stake in the former case. 
 
Model (5) allows an active subject’s behavior to depend on the opponent’s freedom of choice.44 
To see how, let ߤ be the common prior that the opponent is a conditional altruist. Suppose that 
conditional altruists attempt to coordinate on cooperation in T2 but not T1. As an egoist always 
defects (plays D), the requirement for a conditional altruist to be playing C in any equilibrium is 
 ߤሺ50 ൅ 50ߙሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ5 ൒ ߤሺ80 ൅ 5ߙሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ20,  
which simplifies to 
 ߤሺ3ߙ െ 1ሻ ൒ 1.  
Since ߤ must lie between 0 and 1, this in turn boils down to the requirements that ߙ ൒ 2/3, and 
ߙ ൒ ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ/3ߤ.  
                                                 
44 McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) compare behavior in a standard trust game with that in an “involuntary” trust 
game, in which the trustor has no choice but to trust. The trustee is more likely to reward voluntary trust than invol-
untary trust. Since the prisoners’ dilemma is essentially a simultaneous move version of the trust game, their finding 
is quite relevant here.   
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But suppose now instead that one of the players is unable to choose freely – instead the coopera-
tion rate is simply fixed at ߤ for both egoists and conditional altruists, as will be the case in T4 
under our assumption about play in T2. Then, the active player chooses to play C if and only if 
ߤሺ50 ൅ 50ߙߤሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ5 ൒ ߤሺ80 ൅ 5ߙߤሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻሺ20 ൅ 20ߙߤሻ, 
which simplifies to 
 ߤ൫ሺ13ߤ െ 4ሻߙ െ 3൯ ൒ 3.  
 
Again, we can use the fact that ߤ lies between 0 and 1 to deduce the necessary condition 
ߙ ൒ 2/3, just as before. However, the additional requirement on the two parameters is stronger 
than before. (To see this, rewrite the condition as ߙߤሺ13ߤ െ 4ሻ ൒ 3ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ. This inequality is 
never satisfied if ߤ ൑ 4/13. If instead ߤ ൒ 4/13, the condition can be written ߙ ൒ 3ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ/
ሺ13ߤ െ 4ሻߤ, which is implied by the previous condition ߙ ൒ ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ/3ߤ for all ߤ ൏ 1.) For 
example, when ߙ ൌ 1, the critical value of ߤ jumps from 1/2 in the active opponent case to more 
than 4/5 in the passive opponent case. Likewise, if ߙ ൌ 3, the critical value of ߤ jumps from 1/8 
in the active opponent case to more than 1/2 in the passive opponent case. Thus, Model (5) sug-
gests that a cooperative equilibrium which exists when both players are active could well be 
vanishing when one player is passive. Intuitively, this happens both because the active player’s 
utility from the ሺܥ, ܥሻ outcome is smaller under T4 than T2 – as some of the cooperation benefits 
in T4 go to an egoistic opponent – and because the active player’s utility from  ሺܦ, ܦሻ is larger 
under T4 than T2 – as some defecting opponents are conditional altruists (any defecting active 
opponent is an egoist).  
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2.3.3 Findings 
The findings are displayed in Figure 2.6.45 They reveal a social framing effect in the symmetric 
information condition. The fraction of subjects making the cooperative choice increases from 
26.4 percent with the Stock Market Game frame to 44.9 percent with the Community Game 
frame. This difference is statistically significant (one-sided z-test; z = 2.972, p = 0.0015),46 
rejecting the null hypothesis of zero framing effect.  
 
Figure 2.6: Fraction of Cooperative Actions in Treatments 1-4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The difference between the first two bars is the social framing effect in the standard symmetric information condi-
tion. The difference between the second two bars is the social framing effect in the asymmetric information condi-
tion. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
                                                 
45 Throughout, the confidence intervals are normal approximation intervals; given that our samples are large and that 
the cooperation probability is not too close to 0 or 1, the normal approximation to the binomial distribution is known 
to be good. A possible exception is the last pair of bars of Figure 2.10. 
46 As our alternative hypothesis is one-sided (more cooperation under the Community label), we use one-sided tests 
for all comparisons of cooperation levels.  
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Under asymmetric information, on the other hand, the framing effect is insignificant with 26.8 
percent making the cooperative choice with the Stock Market game frame and 28.7 percent with 
the Community Game frame (z = 0.316, p = 0.376). The difference-in-difference between the 
two information conditions is also statistically significant (z = 1.910, p = 0.028), rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the framing effect is the same under asymmetric information as under sym-
metric information, and favoring the alternative hypothesis that the framing effect is larger under 
symmetric information.47  
 
The finding of a social framing effect in treatments 1 and 2 shows that prior findings are robust 
to such features as monetary incentives and lightly loaded instructions. It is somewhat less clear 
how we should interpret the absence of a social framing effect in treatments 3 and 4. Essentially 
subjects in both treatments 3 and 4 have the same cooperation rates as in treatment 1.  
 
Of the five models presented above, only Model (2) and Model (5) are directly consistent with 
the evidence. 
 
As mentioned above, Model (1), the variable sociality hypothesis, could be rescued by invoking 
the argument that the frame is more than just the label. However, Models (3) and (4) can only be 
rescued by assuming that subjects, erroneously, hold other beliefs in the active condition than in 
the passive condition. Liberman, Samuels and Ross (2004) elicited beliefs both by participants 
                                                 
47 Whereas the framing effect was stable between our sample at Södertörn and the one at SSE, the cooperation ratios 
(levels) were not the same. At Södertörn, with a total sample size of 230, the cooperation ratio was 0.327 in treat-
ment 1 and 0.530 in treatment 2 (z=2.245, p=0.012), and 0.328 in treatment 3 and 0.370 in treatment 4 (z=0.530, 
p=0.298). At SSE we had a total sample of 218 and the cooperation ratios were 0.207 in treatment 1 and 0.346 in 
treatment 2 (z=1.625, p=0.052), and 0.204 in treatment 3 and 0.204 in treatment 4 (z=0, p=0.5).  
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and non-participants in their social framing experiment, finding that participants’ beliefs respond 
more strongly to the frame than beliefs of non-participants. Similar differences could in principle 
arise between the active and passive opponent conditions. Arguably, belief elicitation would 
have enabled us to see whether beliefs vary across conditions. However, belief data have prob-
lems of their own. Belief elicitation before subjects choose their action may affect behavior 
(Croson, 1999), belief elicitation after the action choice may be biased by the chosen action 
(Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee, 1977), and in any case the elicited beliefs may be quite differ-
ent from the subjective beliefs that would rationalize the observed choice (Costa-Gomes and 
Weizsäcker, 2008). Thus, we think that a better way to control for differences in beliefs would be 
to induce beliefs directly. For example, one might re-run our four treatments with the modifica-
tion that all subjects in treatments 1 and 3 (2 and 4) are informed about empirical frequencies in 
our treatment 1 (2).48 
 
The subsequent experiments reported below instead pursue different directions, attempting to 
discriminate between the various hypotheses without eliciting or inducing beliefs. 
 
2.4 The Second Study: Social Esteem? 
Our own initial hypothesis was that social framing effects are caused largely by people’s desire 
to look good in the eyes of others, as in Model (2). The findings of the first study are consistent 
with this hypothesis. The second study is designed to provide a sharper test. 
 
                                                 
48 We are grateful to Ernst Fehr for this suggestion. 
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We now modify treatments 3 and 4 of the first study in one crucial respect, namely, by letting the 
passive player observe the game and the choice of the active player. Call the two new treatments 
1’ (Stock Market Game) and 2’ (Community Game) respectively. If it is the difference in infor-
mation that created the discrepancy between treatments 2 and 4, then there should now be a sim-
ilar gap between treatments 1’ and 2’ as between treatments 1 and 2. To be precise, there should 
be a similar gap if subjects’ expected utility of being esteemed by the opponent is independent of 
whether subjects learn about the opponent’s type. On the other hand, if subjects anticipate that 
they will experience stronger feelings of pride or shame if they learn what the opponent chooses, 
as is admitted by Model (2), framing might matter more in treatments 1 and 2 than in 1’ and 2’. 
 
In total, 137 subjects participated as decision-makers in the experiment, which was conducted in 
September 2008. All were freshmen enrolled in a basic microeconomics course at Stockholm 
School of Economics (SSE). In addition, 137 student subjects participated as passive players. 
Notice that the subjects have very similar characteristics to the SSE subjects in Study 1. In both 
cases virtually the entire cohort participates, as participation was the default option for partici-
pants in the course. The only difference is that subjects in Study 2 belong to a later cohort. Both 
experiments were conducted on freshmen very early in the term, and since the program has ex-
tremely competitive entry requirements, the pool of students always comprises the top echelon of 
Swedish students. Since we did not use students from Södertörn (Sn) this time around, we also 
checked for differences in effects between the two populations in the first study. The relative 
magnitude of the framing effects in Study 1 is as large at SSE as at Sn, as discussed in footnote 
47, but the baseline level of cooperation is lower. Therefore, any difference in framing effects is 
unlikely to be caused by subject pool effects. Figure 2.7 displays the findings. 
 
68 
 
Figure 2.7. Fraction of Cooperative Actions in the Second Experiment, Treatments 1’ and 2’. 
 
 
The difference between the two bars is the social framing effect in the symmetric information passive opponent con-
dition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The difference in behavior across treatments is insignificant (z = -0.271, p = 0.393), and the point 
estimate has the wrong sign. Therefore, subject to the caveat that feelings of pride and shame 
could be stronger in the active opponent condition, we find no support for the hypothesis that the 
social framing effect in Study 1 was caused by social esteem considerations. That is, the evi-
dence is unsupportive of Model (2). 
 
2.5 The Third Study: Preferences or Coordination? 
Only after conducting the first two studies did it occur to us that there is another straightforward 
way to distinguish between the variable sociality hypothesis and the coordination hypothesis, 
namely by letting the moves be sequential instead of simultaneous.49 If a Stag hunt game is 
played sequentially, the second mover can always assure herself of playing a best reply, and 
                                                 
49 For a detailed study of behavior in sequential Prisoners’ dilemmas, see Clark and Sefton (2001).  
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hence the efficient equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect outcome. Thus, if any version of 
the coordination hypothesis is correct, there should be no social framing effect.50 On the other 
hand, if the variable sociality hypothesis is correct, there ought to be a social framing effect even 
in the sequential game. In particular, the second mover should be more willing to respond to C 
by playing C in the Community Game than in the Stock Market Game. 
 
To investigate this issue, we conducted a third study with two treatments that we call 1’’ (Stock 
Market Game) and 2’’ (Community Game). These are similar to treatments 1 and 2, except 
moves are sequential instead of simultaneous. Moreover, in order to maximize statistical power 
we ask the second mover to report a contingent strategy; one choice in case the first mover plays 
C and one choice in case the first mover plays D. That is, we adopt the strategy method (Selten, 
1967). While we recognize that the strategy method by itself could have a dampening effect on 
subjects’ willingness to reciprocate (Casari and Cason, 2009), there is no immediate reason to 
expect that the strategy method should also affect the impact of social framing. 
 
In total, 272 subjects participated as decision-makers in the experiment, which was conducted in 
September 2009. As in Study 2, all were freshmen enrolled in a basic microeconomics course at 
SSE. Although they come from a later cohort, we thus expect them to have similar characteristics 
to the SSE students of studies 1 and 2. 
 
                                                 
50 Observe that our argument pertains specifically to sequential stag hunt games, and not to sequential games in 
general. We do not know to what extent the argument generalizes. For example, we have not been able to ascertain 
whether the presence of a framing effect in the multi-round relative of the trust game (form) considered by Burn-
ham, McCabe, and Smith (2000) is consistent with a coordination argument. Moreover, and perhaps more im-
portantly, we think that equilibrium arguments, while always problematic in one-shot situations, are even less ap-
propriate in complicated settings such as theirs. 
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Figure 2.8 displays the proportions of first-movers that choose to play C (i.e., to cooperate) under 
each of the two social frames in the third study. As expected, the level of cooperation is higher 
than in the case of simultaneous moves.51 However, there is no significant social framing effect 
(z = 0.316, p = 0.376). Provided that the expectation about player 2’s behavior is at least as opti-
mistic under the Community Game frame as under the Stock Market Game frame, this evidence 
contradicts the variable sociality hypothesis. 
 
Figure 2.8: Fraction of First-Mover Cooperation in the Third Experiment Treatments 1’’ and 2’’ 
 
The difference between the two bars is the social framing effect for player 1 in the sequential moves condition. Error 
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Since player 2 can condition the action on player 1’s move, there is no role for beliefs when we 
interpret player 2’s behavior. Player 2’s action thus provides an even stronger test of the variable 
sociality hypothesis. Figure 2.9 displays the results. The first pair of bars denotes, for the Stock 
                                                 
51 Recall that the high average cooperation rates in T1 and T2 is driven by the Södertörn subjects. See also footnote 
47.  
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Market Game and the Community Game respectively, the fraction of subjects in the role of 
player 2 that cooperate if player 1 cooperates. The second pair of bars gives the corresponding 
cooperation rates for the case in which player 1 defects.  
 
Figure 2.9: Second-mover cooperation in the Third Experiment Treatments 1’’ and 2’’ 
 
The difference between the first (second) two bars is the social framing effect for player 2, when player 1 cooperated 
(defected), in the sequential moves condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
While there is more cooperation in the Community Game than in the Stock Market game, the 
difference is minor and not statistically significant (conditional on player 1 cooperating, 
z = 0.057, p = 0.477; conditional on player 1 defecting, z = 0.511, p = 0.305).  
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Figure 2.10: Second-Mover Strategies in the Third Experiment Treatments 1’’ and 2’’ 
 
Each staple indicates the fraction of second movers that chose the strategy in the Stock Market frame (first staple in 
each pair) and the Community frame (second staple) respectively. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The lack of significant differences is further emphasized in Figure 2.10, where we break down 
the observations further and consider all the four strategies that player 2 may use; CC denotes 
unconditional cooperation (i.e., always playing C), CD denotes conditional cooperation (play of 
C in response to C and D in response to D), DD denotes unconditional defection, and DC de-
notes defection in response to cooperation and cooperation in response to defection.52 As the 
figure shows, the differences across the two treatments are minor. The null hypothesis that the 
two distributions are identical cannot be rejected (Pearson chi-square = 0.789, p = 0.852). 
Among players who cooperate after cooperation, there is no difference at all. Among players 
who defect after cooperation, cooperation after defection is somewhat more frequent in the 
Community treatment, but the effect is statistically insignificant (p = 0.192). 
 
                                                 
52 The strategy DC may seem unintuitive, but actually makes good sense for an unconditional altruist. If the oppo-
nent cooperates, own cooperation means giving up 30 in order to give 45. If the opponent defects, own cooperation 
means giving up 15 in order to give 60. 
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In our view, the last experiment contradicts the hypothesis that framing effects come exclusively 
through the preference channel, at least as we have modeled it.  
 
However, we acknowledge the possibility that the insignificant aggregate effect at the second 
stage is due to interaction between several types of behavior, of which “variable sociality” is 
one.53 For example, suppose that a fraction of the subjects are conditionally altruistic, with their 
degree of altruism depending on their beliefs about the opponent’s altruism. Suppose that these 
subjects believe that the variable altruism may be applying to their opponent. Then, in the role of 
Player 2, they are more prone to reward cooperation under the Stock Market frame (when only 
the most altruistic opponent types will cooperate) than under the Community frame. Thus, the 
aggregate insensitivity of Player 2 behavior could be generated by a mix of such conditionally 
cooperative types and altruistic types responding to the frame. However, the problem with this 
argument is what it implies for Player 1 equilibrium behavior: In equilibrium, Player 1 behavior 
must differ across frames, with more cooperation under the Community frame, otherwise condi-
tional altruists will not cooperate more under the Stock Market frame. The lack of a significant 
difference in Player 1 behavior thus speaks against this interpretation of Player 2 behavior. 
 
We also acknowledge the possibility that the subject pool in 2009 was significantly different 
from the pool in 2006. While the measurable SSE student characteristics are not likely to have 
changed (the program is exceptionally popular and therefore attracts the top new students every 
year), it is quite possible that important events such as the financial crisis may have affected the 
students’ sensitivity to social frames. If students have become less prone to behave selfishly un-
                                                 
53 We are grateful to Jean Tirole and Dirk Engelmann for helpful discussions concerning the ensuing argument. 
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der the stock market frame, for example due to the public criticism of greedy bankers, that might 
have eliminated frame-sensitive sociality in 2009 even if it was there in 2006.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Our first experiment demonstrates that situational labels significantly affect behavior in social 
dilemma situations even under the kind of experimental conditions conventionally imposed by 
behavioral economists. In this respect, we confirm previous findings that people cooperate more 
when the name of the game emphasizes the community rather than the individual’s interest. 
 
However, the presence of social framing effects does not prove that preferences depend directly 
on situational labels. Taken together, our three experiments – involving more than a thousand 
subjects altogether – instead suggest that social frames primarily serve as coordination devices. 
These findings are good news for economists, whose analysis often rest on the assumption that 
preferences are stable and reasonably simple, a methodological principle most stoutly defended 
by Becker and Stigler (1977). Conversely, the results suggest that some of the critics of eco-
nomic theory, as exemplified by Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) and references therein, might 
shift their focus from economists’ modeling of preferences to their modeling of beliefs. 
 
Among the five explicit models that we consider, a version of the social preferences proposed by 
Charness and Rabin (2002) is the only model not to be severely questioned by our experimental 
data. That is, this formulation seems to be the best description of the game that, to our subjects, 
corresponds to the Prisoners’ dilemma game form. Given such a frame-free description of the 
game, we conjecture that existing models of belief-based framing effects, notably the level-k 
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model of Bacharach and Stahl (2000), can be adapted to articulate more precisely how framing 
affect coordination. However, such a complete non-equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
 
It is clearly desirable to investigate the robustness of our findings. For example, one might vary 
the social frame in other simple game forms, and study other subject pools and contexts. In on-
going work, we are therefore measuring social framing effects in the Dictator game (form). If 
present, such effects would resuscitate the variable sociality hypothesis, since our preferred 
model leaves no room for coordination in a game with only a single active player.54 However, in 
support of the present analysis, the data indicate no social framing effects in the Dictator game. 
 
Although our study is large by current standards, our findings call for replication. Since inter-
experiment comparisons are always less credible than intra-experiment comparisons, we would 
especially like to see a single study that directly compares the impact of social frames in simulta-
neous and sequential Prisoners’ dilemmas.  
  
                                                 
54 Signaling models of Dictator game behavior, such as Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), do have multiple Perfect 
Bayesian Nash equilibria. 
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3. Testosterone Change following Monetary Wins 
and Losses Predicts Future Financial Risk-taking55 
 
3.1 Introduction 
National stock markets often suffer negative returns on days following a country's elimination 
from major sporting events (Edmans et al., 2007). This is a phenomenon not predicted by classi-
cal economic theory, which assumes investors to be rational, calculating and unaffected. Events 
such as this suggest that real decision-makers are subject to feelings, sentiments and sometimes 
error. Indeed, research over the last thirty years has documented numerous ways in which hu-
mans routinely deviate from rational behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Loewenstein, 
2000). While documenting these departures has been an important step in understanding eco-
nomic and financial decision-making, explaining why these behavioral phenomena exist is now 
the current challenge. One candidate proximate mechanism mediating financial decision-making 
is the hormone testosterone (T). While trait level differences in T explain some of the observed 
individual differences in financial risk-taking between men (Apicella et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 
2011) and may account for some of the observed sex differences in risk-taking (Sapienza et al., 
2009), there is much reason to suspect that transient changes in T may also influence financial 
risk-taking and if so, these changes may help to explain documented behavioral phenomena such 
as the sensitivity of economic markets to sporting outcomes (Edmans et al., 2007).  
 
While accumulating evidence over the past two decades has demonstrated widespread effects of 
circulating T on the social behavior of males in many species, including its effects on aggression 
                                                 
55 This is joint work with Coren Appicella and Anna Dreber.  
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(Archer, 2006), mate-seeking (Roney et al., 2003), dominance (Kemper, 1990; Mazur and Booth, 
1998) and more recently, financial risk-taking (Apicella et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 2011) and 
financial profitability in humans (Coates and Herbert, 2008), it has also, conversely, demon-
strated that men's T levels respond to their social milieu and status. For instance, T rises during 
brief interactions with attractive women (Ronay et al., 2003; Ronay and von Hippel, 2010) and 
with the anticipation of a social challenge or contest (Wingfield et al., 1990; Mazur and Booth, 
1998). Also, winners of competitive challenges often experience a relative increase in T com-
pared to losers; a differential response that primarily occurs in men (Bateup et al., 2002), and 
applies to physical competitions, such as wrestling (Elias, 1981) and tennis Booth et al., 1989), 
non-physical competitions, such as chess (Mazur et al., 1992), chance-based competitions, such 
as coin-tosses (McCaul et al., 1992) and political elections (Stanton et al., 2009; Apicella and 
Cesarini, 2011). 
 
Plasticity in T has been interpreted as a means by which male organisms are able to adjust their 
behavior adaptively to a changing social environment (Oliveira, 2004). In humans, an increase in 
T following success in a cognitive spatial task against an opponent predicts men's willingness to 
participate in another competition against the same opponent (Mehta and Josephs, 2006). Fur-
thermore, T changes following a competitive line tracing task also predict future aggressive be-
havior in men (Carré et al., 2009). And finally, increases in T following exposure to attractive 
women predicts male skateboarders' willingness to engage in challenging and physically risky 
stunts (Ronay and von Hippel, 2009). In short, transient increases in T are thought to enhance 
risky and competitive behaviors in men, precisely when those behaviors are likely to be profita-
ble in the evolutionary sense. 
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While this behavioral flexibility to varying levels of T likely evolved because it, on average, 
benefited males, it is also possible that it could lead to irrational decision-making. This may be 
especially true in evolutionarily novel domains, such as financial decision-making or when 
changes in T resulting from one event influence the behavior of an organism in a separate and 
independent event. Indeed, if changes in T influence financial decision-making in men, this may 
help to explain a number of documented behavioral economic phenomena such as a) the house 
money effect (an increase in risk-seeking following a prior gain, Thaler and Johnson, 1990), b) 
increases in financial risk-taking by men following physical contact with a woman (Levav and 
Argo, 2010) and c) national stock market declines after a country's sports team experiences a de-
feat (Edmans et al., 2007). 
 
While T changes at the level of the group may help explain group-level phenomena, we are spe-
cifically interested in whether individual differences in T reactivity are associated with financial 
risk-taking since there is much evidence that the magnitude of the T response in men does vary 
(Cohen et al., 1996; Pound et al., 2009). In this study, we investigate whether changes in T, fol-
lowing monetary wins and losses, influence subsequent financial risk-taking. Male participants 
played 15 rounds of a largely chance-based game (rock, paper, scissors) against one another for 
money. The pairs were assigned to one of two monetary treatments. Depending on the treatment, 
the pair of participants had either USD 5 or USD 15 placed in front of them. Each participant had 
the same amount of money in front of them as their opponent and in both conditions the partici-
pants could either win USD 5 from their opponent or lose USD 5 to their opponent. We specifi-
cally designed the study such that the winners who ended up with USD 10 could be directly 
compared to the losers who ended up with same amount, given the distinct possibility that earn-
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ings could affect their risk-aversion. Thus we compare the winners from the USD 5 condition to 
the losers from USD 15 condition since both groups would have the same resulting income of 
USD 10 (n = 49). The participant who won the most rounds of the game was declared the win-
ner. About twenty minutes following the competition, we measured participants risk-aversion as 
their willingness to accept a lottery over a certain amount in a series of incentivized choices. This 
is a common method used to elicit risk-aversion, and it has been showed to correlate with risk-
taking behavior outside the lab (Dohmen et al., 2011). To assess change in T, a first saliva sam-
ple was collected from participants immediately upon arrival to the study site. A second saliva 
sample was collected approximately 30 minutes following the competition. 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Subjects 
A total of 114 men participated in the experiment which was conducted at the Harvard Decision 
Science Laboratory during five days in late November and early December 2011. Of those, 16 
men were excluded from the analysis because they reported taking psychotropic or steroid medi-
cations. Exclusion of these participants is standard procedure due to the possibility that these 
medications could affect their T levels and/or behavior. This exclusion criterion was determined 
prior to running any of the analyses. In total, 98 men participated in the study and 49 ended up 
with USD10 after having won or lost the competition. Each participant was only allowed to par-
ticipate once. The average participant was 33 years old. A total of 19 experimental sessions with 
six participants each were conducted. Sessions were conducted throughout the day (while T does 
display significant diurnal variation we were interested in T change rather than absolute levels 
and were hence not confined to conduct sessions at a specific time of day for all participants). 
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Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes and participants earned on average USD 25.6, includ-
ing a show-up fee of USD 10. 
 
3.2.2 Procedures 
After having signed the consent forms, participants were seated in the lab. Before any other in-
structions were given, a first sample of saliva was collected from each participant in a 2 ml 
cryovial. The second saliva sample was collected about 30 minutes after the competition. The 
cryovials were frozen immediately after collection and the samples were sent to Salimetrics for 
analysis. 
 
A filler task containing a non-incentivized price estimation task was conducted immediately fol-
lowing the first sampling of saliva. Thereafter participants were informed about the rules and 
procedures for the Rock, Paper and Scissors competition. Pairs of two participants were ran-
domly formed and each pair was taken to an adjacent room by one of the three female experi-
menters. In this room the two contestants were seated at opposite sides of the table and each 
given three laminated cards with the symbols of Rock, Paper, and Scissors respectively. Partici-
pants were again informed of the rules (rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper and paper beats 
rock) and were told that they would play 15 rounds against each other by choosing one card each 
round. The person who won the majority of rounds would win the competition and get USD 5 
from the loser. Before the start of the competition both participants had a certain amount of dol-
lars at the table in front of them (either USD 5 or USD 15 depending on the treatment). As noted 
above, we specifically designed the study such that the 49 winners who ended up with USD 10 
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could be compared to the 49 losers who ended up with same amount, given the distinct possibil-
ity that earnings could affect their risk-aversion. 
 
During the competition, the experimenter kept score on a small whiteboard. After the 15 rounds 
were conducted, the experimenter announced the winner and took five dollar bills from the loser 
and gave to the winner. If there was a tie at this point more rounds were played until a winner 
could be declared. The competition lasted for 5-10 minutes and thereafter participants were taken 
back to the computer lab where they were given five minutes to write about their experiences in 
the competition. The reason for this writing exercise was to provide participants the opportunity 
to reflect on the competition and the outcome. The participants were then told that the remainder 
of the study would consist of incentivized choices. Here risk attitudes were elicited with partici-
pants making ten computerized choices between a certain amount and a lottery. The latter was a 
coin toss with a 50 percent chance of winning USD 10. The certain amount varied from USD 1 
to USD 10 and the number of times that a participant chose the certain payoff was used as the 
measure of risk aversion. This results in a risk preference score between 0 and 10. An average of 
5.5 indicates risk neutrality. At the end of the experiment participants were paid according to the 
outcome of one of their ten decisions. The decision that was realized was selected at random. 
 
After having been paid their earnings from the experiment in private, participants filled out a 
questionnaire that among other things contained questions about age, sexuality, relationship sta-
tus and potential use of psychotropic or steroid medications. 
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3.3 Results 
Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics for the whole sample of 49 men and separately by win-
ners and losers.  
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated, baseline T does not differ between winners and losers (t-test p = 0.5407). There 
was an overall rise in T in 73 percent of the participants from before the competition to after the 
competition. This result is not surprising since increases in T, in response to a challenge, have 
been documented (Wingfield et al., 1990; Wobber et al., 2010), though this is the first time it has 
been shown for a financial challenge. The change in T is also associated with the outcome of the 
competition though as expected from previous studies (Pound et al., 2009; Levav and Argo, 
2010) there is substantial inter-individual variation in the change within both the winners and 
losers. On average, winning men's T levels increased 12 percent more than losing men (see Table 
3.1) and for men who won by a tighter margin the increase was even greater. That is, the closer 
the final scores were between the participants or the more fierce the competition, the greater the 
increase. In a regression analysis where we control for the difference in score between the player 
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and his opponent, winning leads to a significantly greater increase in T compared to losing 
(coeff = 44.92, p = 0.020). 
 
Changes in T significantly predict risk aversion in our sample of men (see Table 3.2). That is, 
men who experience an increase in T are less risk-averse (coeff = -0.015, p = 0.009). To isolate 
the importance of changes in T on risk-aversion, we control for the binary winner variable when 
examining the relationship between T change and risk aversion. We still find that the greater the 
T increase, the lower the risk aversion (coeff = -0.014, p = 0.020). That is, men who experienced 
a greater increase in T were less risk-averse (Figure 3.1). In fact, whether participants won or lost 
in this model does not predict risk-aversion (coeff = -0.44, p = 0.404). 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics.  
 
 
 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of risk aversion on testosterone change, whether the participant won or lost, 
score difference between participant and opponent and controls (age, sexual orientation and time of day). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
This provides evidence that it is changes in T that influence risk-taking in men and not the act of 
winning or losing itself or other biological mechanisms that are orthogonal to T. 
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The result is also robust when we control for both the winner variable and the difference in score 
between the participant and his opponent (coeff = -0.016, p = 0.022), and when we include addi-
tional control variables such as year of birth, time of the day for data collection, and sexual ori-
entation (variables that might correlate with the change in T or risk-aversion) to the previous re-
gression (coeff = -0.021, p = 0.011).  
 
Figure 3.1: Testosterone Change by Risk Aversion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N = 49. Line is least square fit.  
 
On average, participants made choices exhibiting more risk aversion than the risk neutral, profit 
maximizing choices. However, participants in the quintile with the largest T increase experi-
enced a reduction in risk aversion leading to decisions that were in fact, risk neutral, and hence 
profit-maximizing. On the other hand, participants in the quintile with the largest T decrease had 
a risk aversion score almost 40 percent higher than the risk neutral score (see Figure 3.2). Taken 
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together, our results provide strong evidence that T reactivity to competitive outcomes influences 
risk-aversion in men in ways that influence their financial payoffs. 
 
Figure 3.2: Quintile of Testosterone Change by Risk Aversion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Line represents risk neutrality. 
 
While rock, paper, scissors is a largely chance-based game and it is unlikely from our pool of 
subjects that there were sophisticated players, it should still be noted that winning or losing may 
not be exactly random and that factors associated with the T response may be correlated with the 
skill of the game. While not explicitly asked, many of the participants reported that they either 
did not have a strategy or that they perceived the game to be chance-based. To test whether our 
winners were more likely to win compared to chance expectations we ran 1000 simulations of 
our exact rock, paper, scissors game but where the outcomes were based on chance. We found no 
evidence that the number of rounds of rock, paper, scissors that was won by the winners was 
greater than what would be expected by chance. The winners in our random simulation won by 
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the same margin (M = 2.62, sd = 1.84) as the real winners in our game (M = 2.80, sd = 2.25), 
suggesting that winners and losers were randomly assigned (95 percent CI: 2.38-2.90). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
There is ample heterogeneity in economic preferences both within and between individuals - an 
observation that has motivated a large body of research to try to explain why these differences 
exist. Despite considerable efforts, individual differences in economic decision-making remain 
largely unexplained (Camerer, 2003). One possible reason is that traditional attempts to under-
stand economic behavior have been made under the assumption that preferences are stable within 
individuals (Stigler and Becker, 1977). While relatively stable individual differences do exist, it 
is clear that preferences are flexible with the most extreme occurrence being preference reversal 
(Tversky and Thaler, 1990). The failure to find robust correlates to variation in economics pref-
erences suggests that other factors, largely independent of socio-demographics, such as biologi-
cal, psychological and situational sources, as well as their interactions, account for some of the 
variation between and within individuals. Here we demonstrate that individual differences in T 
reactivity in response to a situational event is associated with financial risk-taking. 
 
The extent to which biological factors, such as T, mediate differences in economic decision-
making, is a current source of investigation by many researchers (Burnham, 2007; Apicella et al., 
2008; Cesarini et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 2009; Bos et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2011). While 
some previous research suggests that baseline differences in T may account for differences in 
risk preferences between men (Apicella et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 2011), and that male traders' 
profits increase on days when their T is highest (Coates and Herbert, 2008) our findings are the 
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first to directly link transient changes in T to financial risk in men. Specifically, we demonstrate 
that changes in T, following monetary wins and losses, predict men's risk-aversion. By control-
ling for income effects in our design and whether or not men won or lost in our analyses, we can 
be confident that it is changes in T that mediate men's risk preferences. 
 
While our sample size is small, it is comparable, if not larger, than samples found in many hor-
monal studies examining changes in T within individuals (Elias, 1981; Roney et al., 2003; Mehta 
and Josephs, 2006; Coates and Herbert, 2008; Bos et al., 2010; Apicella and Cesarini, 2011). Our 
findings are also consistent with the non-human animal literature where males across a range of 
species engage in risky behaviors in response to increases in T, particularly during the breeding 
season (Wingfield et al., 1990). Short-term increases in T may be designed to increase risk in 
males precisely when risky behaviors could lead to a good outcome and possibly greater repro-
ductive success. As an example, mating calls by males are risky because they open males up to 
predation, but they also attract more females. As such, increased risk is not linked to greater re-
productive success in females as it is in males. Females also have less androgen-responsive neu-
rons, rendering them less responsive to the behavioral influences of T (Wood and Newman, 
1999). Indeed, the only other study to directly examine the influence of increased T (adminis-
tered exogenously), on risk preferences was conducted on women and did not find an effect 
Zethraeus et al., 2009). 
 
The significance of our results not only depend on how closely tied men's risk preferences are to 
changes in their T levels, but also to how readily changeable T is within men. If T were stable in 
men then our findings would bear little significance. But T levels are not static – in fact they vary 
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in predictable ways. Changes in T have been linked to diet (Hämäläinen et al., 1984), exercise 
(Weiss et al., 1983), age (Kaufman and Vermeulen, 2005), mate seeking (Roney et al., 2003; 
Roney et al., 2007), competitive challenges (Wingfield et al., 1990; Mazur and Booth, 1998), 
victories and defeats (Elias, 1981; Booth et al., 1989; Mazur et al., 1992; McCaul et al., 1992; 
Stanton et al., 2009; Apicella and Cesarini, 2011) as well as major life events such as fatherhood 
and marriage (Gray et al., 2002; Burnham et al., 2003; Gettler et al., 2011). Likewise, many of 
these events have also been linked to changes in risk-taking in ways that are consistent with what 
we would expect if the phenomena were mediated by changes in T. 
 
To the extent to which we can predict events that influence T levels in individuals and in groups, 
we would be in a better position to predict the behavior of not only individual investors but ulti-
mately, market economies. Many instances of collective phenomena, such as crowd effects or 
herd behavior have been documented in financial markets. It is possible that changes in T at the 
group level may be a proximate cause of some of these observations. Likewise, T may impact 
economic behavior at various stages in the business cycle. If the fact that people experience more 
frequent financial gains in an upturn, and more frequent financial losses in a downturn, and this 
in turn influences T and thereby risk aversion, we could observe T propagating the business cy-
cle. We look forward to future research investigating these possibilities further. 
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A: Appendices to Chapter 1 
Appendix A.1: Experimental Instructions 
[Screen 1:] 
Hi and welcome! In this study you can earn some money. The amount will depend on your deci-
sions and the decisions of the other participants. The study has one introductory part and several 
parts where you can earn money. At the end of the study, your earnings (10 points correspond to 
$3) will be added to the show-up fee of $10 and you will be paid in private, in cash before you 
leave. We will go through the instructions now. If you have any questions after you have read 
and heard the instructions, please press the help button or raise your hand. Otherwise, no com-
munication is permitted during the study. You are also not allowed to use mobile phones or other 
electronic devices. 
 
[Shown in treatment 1, 1b, 1c and 3] There are 16 people, including you, participating in this 
study at the same time as you. You are all in this room. The 16 of you are divided into two col-
ors: orange and purple. There are 12 orange people and 4 purple people. On the next screen you 
will learn which color you have. 
 
[Shown in treatment 2 and 4] There are 16 people, including you, participating in this study at 
the same time as you. You are all in this room. The 16 of you are divided into two colors: orange 
and purple. There are 8 orange people and 8 purple people. On the next screen you will learn 
which color you have. 
[Screen 2:] 
Your color is: [ORANGE/PURPLE]. There is a total of [12/4/8/8] [ORANGE/PURPLE] people, 
including you. The other color is [PURPLE/ORANGE]. There are [4/12/8/8] [purple/orange] 
people. Please do not press the OK button until we have given you a wristband with your color.  
[Screen 3:] 
Use the paper and pen that are available on your desk. Write down a list of 5 associations to your 
color, which is [ORANGE/PURPLE]. You have a total of 2 minutes available for this task. 
When you have finished, press the OK button. [Papers collected after 2 minutes and a paper 
with key info about next part given out.] 
[Screen 4:] 
[Shown in treatment 1, 1b, 2, 3 and 4] We now move on to the first part of the study where you 
can earn money. In this part of the study you are asked to correctly solve as many math problems 
as possible. You have five minutes available. In each problem, you are asked to sum up five two-
digit numbers. An example could be 32+97+13+62+20. In this case the correct answer is 224. 
For each correct answer you will receive 1 point. At the end of the study you will learn how 
many of your answers were correct and how many points you earned. This will then be con-
verted to dollars and paid out in cash. Please make sure to stop solving and press the OK button 
when we tell you that the time limit is up. Failing to do so can negatively affect your payoffs. If 
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you have finished all the tasks before the time limit is up, press ok and then wait until the study 
continues.  
 
[Shown in treatment 1c] We now move on to the first part of the study where you can earn 
money. In this part of the study, the first part, you are asked to correctly solve as many math 
problems as possible. You have five minutes available. In each problem, you are asked to sum up 
five numbers. The math task can be either easy or hard. If it is easy, the numbers have two digits. 
An example could then be 32+97+13+62+20. In this case the correct answer is 224. If it is hard, 
the numbers have three digits. An example could then be 223+761+130+409+901. In this case 
the correct answer is 2424. Regardless of whether the math task is easy or hard, you receive 1 
point for each correct answer. The orange players do the easy math task and the purple players 
do the hard math task. At the end of the study you will learn how many of your answers were 
correct and how many points you earned. This will then be converted to dollars and paid out in 
cash. Please make sure to STOP solving and press the OK button when we tell you that the time 
limit is up. Failing to do so can negatively affect your payoffs. If you have finished all the tasks 
before the time limit is up, press ok and then wait until the study continues. 
[Screen 5:] 
We will now check that everyone has understood the instructions for part 1 correctly! Please an-
swer the questions on this screen. If you need help, please press the help button or raise your 
hand. When you have finished answering, please press "I understand". If any of your answers are 
incorrect, the program will tell you so and you get to answer that question again. [Quiz is given.] 
[Screen 6:] 
The math solving task will start in a few moments. 
[Screen 7:] 
Add up the five numbers in each row and write the sum in the box labeled "total". Please make 
sure to STOP solving and press the OK button when we tell you that the time limit is up. [Math 
tasks on screen.] 
[Screen 8:] 
It has now been determined how many of your answers were correct. At the end of the study, you 
will learn how many correct answers you gave and the money you earned will be given to you in 
cash. We now move on to part 2 of the study where you can earn more money. Please do not 
press OK until you have received the paper with the key information about part 2. [Paper with 
key info about part 2 handed out]. 
[Screen 9:] 
We now move on to part 2 of the study. In this part two different groups will be formed. 8 out of 
the 16 people in this room will be members of a HIGH-STAKE GROUP. The other 8 will re-
main in the study as members of the REGULAR-STAKE GROUP. The people who are selected 
for the high-stake group will have the chance to earn more money than those who are in the reg-
ular-stake group. 
 
[Shown in treatment 1b:] The payoff rule in part 2 is as follows: If the high-stake group consists 
of an equal number of purple and orange participants, the payoffs in the high-stake group will be 
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twice as large as in the regular-stake group. If the high-stake group does not consist of an equal 
number of purple and orange participants, the payoffs in the high-stake group will be the same as 
in the regular-stake group. 
 
[Shown in treatment 1, 1b, and 1c:] The 8 high-stake group members will consist of 4 orange 
and 4 purple players. Since there are only 4 purple participants, the 4 purple high-stake members 
are simply these 4. The 4 orange high-stake members are the 4 orange participants, out of the 
totally 12 orange participants, who solved most math problems correctly in part 1. 
 
[Shown in treatment 3:] The 8 high-stake group members will consist of 4 orange and 4 purple 
players. Since there are only 4 purple participants, the 4 purple high-stake members are simply 
these 4. The 4 orange high-stake members are 4 randomly chosen orange participants, out of the 
totally 12 orange participants. 
 
[Shown in treatment 1b:] The reason that all the purple participants are selected as members of 
the high-stake group is that this group then has an equal number of orange and purple partici-
pants. Thereby the payoffs for all high-stake group members are doubled. 
 
[Shown in treatment 1c:] The reason that all the purple participants are selected as members of 
the high-stake group is that they thereby are compensated for the fact that their math task was 
harder in Part 1. 
 
[Shown in treatment 2:] The 8 high-stake group members will consist of 4 orange and 4 purple 
players. The 4 purple high-stake members are the 4 purple participants, out of the totally 8 purple 
participants, who solved most math problems correctly in part 1. The 4 orange high-stake mem-
bers are the 4 orange participants, out of the totally 8 orange participants, who solved most math 
problems correctly in part 1. 
 
[Shown in treatment 4:] The 8 high-stake group members will consist of 4 orange and 4 purple 
players. The 4 purple high-stake members are 4 randomly chosen purple participants, out of the 
totally 8 purple participants. The 4 orange high-stake members are 4 randomly chosen orange 
participants, out of the totally 8 orange participants. 
 
You will shortly be informed about whether you have been selected as a member of the high-
stake group or whether you remain in the study as a member of the regular-stake group. After the 
high-stake group has been formed, everyone will play a game. The game will be identical for 
everyone, but the people in the high-stake group will have the chance to earn more money. We 
will go through the instructions for the game in part 2 now. Please press the OK button.  
[Screen 10:] 
THE GAME: This game is played in pairs so you will play with one person at a time. Every per-
son will play the game seven times with seven different people. At the end of the study, you will 
get paid according to the outcome of one randomly chosen game out of the seven. What you earn 
in that game will be converted to dollars and paid out in cash together with your other earnings. 
In this game both people in the pair start with an endowment of a certain number of points. Your 
task is to choose how much of your endowment to keep and how much to contribute to a project. 
The sum of the points that you, and the person you are playing with, contribute to the project will 
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be multiplied by 1.5. The resulting number of points will then be divided equally between the 
two of you. Your earnings will hence be whatever you keep plus your share of the payoff from 
the project. 
 
There are two differences between the high-stake group and the regular-stake group. 1. Everyone 
will only play with members of their own group. I.e. members of the regular-stake group will 
play with each other and the members of the high-stake group will play with each other. 2. The 
endowment is 10 points in the regular-stake group and 20 points in the high-stake group. I.e. 
members of the high-stake group have the chance to earn more money. Let’s now look at two ex-
amples. 
 
EXAMPLE 1: A game in the regular-stake group. Imagine that you are a player in the regular-
stake group and hence you play with another member of the regular-stake group. You both have 
an endowment of 10 points. You contribute 4 points to the project and the person you are playing 
with contributes 6 points. The sum of the contributions is then 4+6=10 points. The final payoff 
from the project will be 10*1.5=15 points. This will be divided between you and the person you 
are paired with so that you both get 15/2=7.5 points from the project. Since you kept 6 points out 
of your original 10, you will end up with 6+7.5=13.5 points from this game. The other person 
kept 4 points and will get 4+7.5=11.5 points. 
 
EXAMPLE 2: A game in the high-stake group. Imagine that you are a player in the high-stake 
group and hence you play with another member of the high-stake group. You both have an en-
dowment of 20 points. You contribute 12 points to the project and the person you are playing 
with contributes 8 points. The sum of the contributions is then 12+8=20 points. The final payoff 
from the project will be 20*1.5=30 points. This will be divided between you and the person you 
are paired with so that you both get 30/2=15 points from the project. Since you kept 8 points out 
of your original 20, you will end up with 8+15=23 points from this game. The other person kept 
12 points and will get 12+15=27 points. Please click OK.  
[Screen 11:] 
We will now check that everyone has understood the instructions for part 2 correctly! Please an-
swer the questions on the screen. If you need help, please press the help button or raise your 
hand. When you have finished answering, please press "I understand". After everyone has fin-
ished answering the questions below, we will announce if you have been selected for the high-
stake group or not. [Quiz is given.] 
[Screen 12:] 
[Shown to those selected for the high-stake group:] You have been selected as a member of the 
high-stake group. You will now play the game with each of the other seven members of the high-
stake group. 
 
[Shown to those not selected for the high-stake group:] You have not been selected as a member 
of the high-stake group. Hence you remain in the study as a member of the regular-stake group. 
You will now play the game with each of the other seven members of the regular-stake group. 
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[Screen 13:] 
[Shown to those in high-stake group:] You are a member of the high-stake group and you will 
play the game with each of the other 7 members of the high-stake group. All 7 games are carried 
out at the same time. The game is played anonymously and the only thing you know about the 
person you play a certain game with is that person's color. In each game you have 20 points. You 
have to decide how many points to keep and how many to contribute to the project. When you 
have made your choice in all games, please press OK. 
 
[Shown to those in regular-stake group:] You are a member of the regular-stake group and you 
will play the game with each of the other 7 members of the regular-stake group. All 7 games are 
carried out at the same time. The game is played anonymously and the only thing you know 
about the person you play a certain game with is that person's color. In each game you have 10 
points. You have to decide how many points to keep and how many to contribute to the project. 
When you have made your choice in all games, please press OK. 
[Screen 14:] 
All 7 games have now been conducted and one game has been chosen randomly for payment. 
You will learn the outcome at the end of the study, just before your earnings are paid out in cash. 
We now move on to part 3, which is the last part of the study. Please press OK to proceed to part 
3. 
 [Screen 15 to end:] 
While we prepare your payments, please answer a few questions.  
[Questions about fairness perception, gender, age, ethnicity, etc given] 
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Appendix A.2: Orange and Purples 
Figure A.1: Percentage Female, Orange and Purple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for t-test. No difference between colors (p>0.1 in two-sample t-test with 
equal variances). Number of participants: 352.  
 
 
Figure A.2: Mean Age, Orange and Purple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for t-test. No difference between colors (p>0.1 in two-sample t-test with 
equal variances). Number of participants: 350.  
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Figure A.3: Percentage Non-White, Orange and Purple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for t-test. No difference between colors (p>0.1 in two-sample t-test with 
equal variances). Number of participants: 313.  
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Appendix A.3: Math Task Performance 
Figure A.4: Distribution of Math Task Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of participants with specific number of correct answers in the math task. Excludes the participants in treat-
ment 1c who added up three-digit numbers. Number of participants: 340. 
 
 
Table A.1: Correlates of Math Task Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent 
variable: Number of correct math tasks. Female: dummy equal to 1 if female. Age: age in years. Non-white: dummy 
equal to 1 if participant has ethnicity other than white. Three-digits: dummy equal to 1 if participant solved math 
task with three digits (true for N=12 in treatment 1b).  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ‐0.70** ‐0.76**
(0.34) (0.34)
Age ‐0.10** ‐0.10**
(0.04) (0.04)
Non‐white 0.32 0.37
(0.34) (0.34)
Three‐digits ‐2.55*** ‐2.42** ‐2.48*** ‐2.42***
(0.93) (0.93) (0.94) (0.93)
Constant 10.15*** 12.08*** 9.26*** 12.26***
(0.26) (0.98) (0.23) (1.02)
N  352 352 352 352
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Appendix A.4: Sessions Fall 2011 and Spring 2012 
Figure A.5: Results of treatments 1 and 2: fall 2011, spring 2012 and pooled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars mark 95% confidence interval for Wald test with se clustered on participant and session. 2011: Number 
of observations: 336, number of participants: 48, number of sessions: 6. Spring 2012: Number of observations: 224, 
number of participants: 32, number of sessions: 4. 
 
 
Table A.2: Regression results of treatments 1 and 2: fall 2011, spring 2012 and pooled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Percentage cooperation .OLS. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust 
standard error in parentheses. Clustered as indicated in table. (1): Only data from fall 2011. (2): Only data from 
spring 2012. (3) and (4): Pooled data 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quota ‐0.21*** ‐0.24*** ‐0.22*** ‐0.21***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Spring 0.06
(0.06)
Quota*Spring ‐0.03
(0.7)
Constant 0.52*** 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.52***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Multicluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (N) 336 224 560 560
Cluster (ind) 48 32 80 80
Cluster (session) 6 4 10 10
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Appendix A.5: Robustness Checks 
Order Effects 
It can be hypothesized that the size of the ingroup favoritism is suppressed as a consequence of 
how the seven public good games are displayed. The fact that players make all decisions simulta-
neously may create an experimented demand effect for treating subjects of different colors equal. 
If this would be the case, we could expect subjects whose first game is against someone of the 
same color to have a higher overall cooperation level than subjects whose first game is against 
someone of the other color. This is under the assumption that subjects make a decision which is 
unaffected (or at least less affected) by the abovementioned demand effect in the first game and 
thereafter anchor decisions on their own choice in that game. The table below tests for such order 
effects and finds no evidence for their existence in the data.  
 
Table A.3: Cooperation controlling for color of opponent in first game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Percentage cooperation. OLS. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust 
standard error in parentheses. Clustered as indicated in table. (1): Only data from control treatment (T2). (2): Only 
data from quota treatment (T1). (3) and (4): Data from both treatments.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same_color_first 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
(0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Quota  ‐0.24***
(0.04)
Quota*Same_color_first 0.03
(0.1)
Constant 0.54*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.54***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Multicluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (N) 280 280 560 560
Cluster (ind) 40 40 80 80
Cluster (session) 5 5 10 10
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Standard Error Clustering and Distributional Assumptions 
The data can be analyzed in different ways with regards to how standard errors are clustered and 
which distributional assumptions are made, without the results being affected. The table below 
shows five methods of analyzing the data, using the main result reported in Figure 1 as an illus-
trative example. Results reported in the paper are from method (3) but all conclusions drawn are 
robust to the use of either method (comparable tables with the results for all analysisin Section 3 
is available from the author).  
 
Table A.4: Cooperation controlling for color of opponent in first game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Percentage cooperation. OLS. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust 
standard error in parentheses. Clustered as indicated in table. (1): Only data from control treatment (T2). (2): Only 
data from quota treatment (T1). (3) and (4): Data from both treatments.  
 
Results are also robust to the use of non-parametric tests, such as the Mann-Whitney test. For the 
hypothesis tested in figure 1, the Mann-Whitney test yields z=-2.797 and prob>|z|= 0.005 if be-
havioral observations are averaged for each individual and z=-2.611 and prob>|z|= 0.009, if they 
are averaged for each session. Not only this result, but also all other results reported in the paper, 
are robust to using this non-parametric test instead of the t- test. Results of Mann-Whitney tests 
for the complete analysis in Section 3 are available from the author.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quota ‐0.2194643*** ‐0.2194643*** ‐0.2194643*** ‐0.2194643*** ‐0.2194643***
 (0.0673486)  (0.0363049)  (0.0363049)  (0.0677183)  (0.0365042)
N 560 560 560 80 80
Cluster individual Yes No Yes No No
Cluster session No Yes Yes No Yes
Average obs per ind No No No Yes Yes
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Appendix A.6: Regression Tables 
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OLS. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. Clustered as 
indicated in table.  
 
 
 
 
OLS. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. Clustered as 
indicated in table. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Percentage contribution in PG‐game
T1 and T1b T1b and T2 T1 and T1c T1c and T2 T1, T1b, T1c, T2
(3) (4) (1) (2) (5)
Quota ‐0.2602976*** ‐0.2245833*** ‐0.2194643***
 (0.0500737)  (0.0763087)  (0.0355993)
Efftreat ‐0.0408333
 (0.0458854)
Fairtreat ‐0.005119
 (0.0736282)
Efftreat*Quota ‐0.0408333
 (0.0443543)
Fairtreat*Quota ‐0.005119
 (0.0711714)
Multi‐cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr of obs 448 448 448 448 896
Nr of cluster (id) 64 64 64 64 128
Nr of cluster (session) 8 8 8 8 16
Dependent variable: Percentage contribution in PG‐game
T3 and T4 T1, T2, T3, T4
(1) (3)
Quota 0.0797619 ‐0.2194643***
 (0.0929517)  (0.0355993)
Random ‐0.1332143
 (0.0869024)
Random*Quota 0.2992262***
 (0.0946053)
Multi‐cluster Yes Yes
Nr of obs 336 896
Nr of cluster (id) 48 128
Nr of cluster (session) 6 16
Table A.7: Regressions Treatment 1, 1b, 1c and 2 
Table A.8: Regressions Treatment 1, 2, 3 and 4 
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Dependent variable: Fairness perception
T1 and T2 T1 and T1b T1 and T1c T3 and T4
(1) (3) (2) (4)
Quota ‐0.1964729** ‐0.3276486***
 (0.079424)  (0.0795196)
Fairtreat 0.164276*
 (0.089525)
Efftreat ‐0.148224
 (0.0959723)
N 127 109 109 88
OLS. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.  
 
Table A.9: Regressions on Fairness Perceptions, all treatments  
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B: Appendices to Chapter 2 
Appendix B.1: Instructions in Treatment 1 and 2 in study 1 
Stock Market Game [Community Game]56, instructions 
 
Hi and welcome. You are going to take part in the Stock Market Game [Community Game]. 
For your participation you will get compensation. This compensation is dependent on the choices 
you make.  
 
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come and help you. Do not ask questions without raising your hand first. It is 
also important that you do not speak to the other participants while the experiment is taking 
place.  
 
In the Stock Market Game [Community Game] you are paired up with a person in another room. 
You will not get any information about who that person is, neither before nor after the experi-
ment. The other person will not get information about your identity either.  
 
All people in this room and all people in the other room get the same instructions and compensa-
tions for taking part in the experiment. 
 
The Stock Market Game [Community Game] looks like this: 
 
                             Stock Market Game [Community Game] 
 
  You 
  A B 
 
The other 
person 
 
A 
50 80
50 5 
 
B 
5 20
80 20 
 
You and the other person choose simultaneously between A and B. Depending on your respec-
tive choices, you end up in one of the four squares in the matrix above. The bold numbers in the 
upper right corner represents, in Swedish kronor, what you get and the numbers in the lower left 
corner represents what the other person gets.  
 
Examples: 
• If both you and the other person choose A you both get 50 kronor.  
                                                 
56 The name ‘Stock Market Game’ was used in treatment 1 and the name ‘Community Game’ was used in treatment 
2. 
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• If both you and the other person choose B you both get 20 kronor.  
• If you choose A and the other person chooses B you get 5 kronor and the other per-
son gets 80 kronor.  
• If you choose B and the other person chooses A you get 80 kronor and the other 
person gets 5 kronor.  
 
Please note that you will not know anything about the decision of the other person when you 
make your decision.  
 
Write your decision on the form marked “answering form”. Then turn the form upside-down and 
put it in front of you.  
 
When the Stock Market Game [Community Game] is finished, the experimenter will compile the 
results and prepare an envelope for each participant. These envelopes will then be distributed. 
The envelope will contain information about how the other person decided and what the result of 
the game was. The sum you are allotted will also be in the envelope.   
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix B.2: Instructions in Treatment 3 and 4 in study 1 
Stock Market Game [Community Game]57, instructions 
 
Hi and welcome. You are going to take part in the Stock Market Game [Community Game]. 
For your participation you will get compensation. This compensation is dependent on the choices 
you make.  
 
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come and help you. Do not ask questions without raising your hand first. It is 
also important that you do not speak to the other participants while the experiment is taking 
place.  
 
In the Stock Market Game [Community Game] you are paired up with a computer. To the com-
puter a receiver is connected. The receiver is a person sitting in another room. You will not get 
any information about who the receiver is, neither before nor after the experiment. The receiver 
will not get information about your identity either.  
 
The receiver makes no decision during the experiment but get the compensation that the com-
puter is allotted. This person knows only that the money that she or he gets is the results of an 
experiment. The person does not know which game that has been played and thus not how you or 
the computer acted.  
 
All people in this room get the same instructions and compensations for taking part in the ex-
periment. 
 
The Stock Market Game [Community Game] looks like this: 
 
                             Stock Market Game [Community Game] 
 
  You 
  A B 
 
The com-
puter / the 
receiver 
 
A 
50 80
50 5 
 
B 
5 20
80 20 
 
You and the computer choose simultaneously between A and B. Depending on your respective 
choices, you end up in one of the four squares in the matrix above. The bold numbers in the up-
per right corner represents, in Swedish kronor, what you get and the numbers in the lower left 
corner represents what the receiver gets.  
 
                                                 
57 The name ‘Stock Market Game’ was used in treatment 3 and the name ‘Community Game’ was used in treatment 
4. 
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Examples: 
• If both you and the computer choose A you get 50 kronor and the receiver gets 50 
kronor.  
• If both you and the computer choose B you get 20 kronor and the receiver gets 20 
kronor.  
• If you choose A and the computer chooses B you get 5 kronor and the receiver gets 
80 kronor.  
• If you choose B and the computer chooses A you get 80 kronor and the receiver 
gets 5 kronor.  
 
When the computer chooses between A and B it is done in the following way: we conduct this 
experiment also with people playing against each other. Depending on how the players act in that 
game we calculate with which probability the computer must choose A and B respectively to 
“imitate” the behavior of a human player.  
 
Please note that you will not know anything about the decision of the computer when you make 
your decision.  
 
Write your decision on the form marked “answering form”. Then turn the form upside-down and 
put it in front of you.   
 
When the Stock Market Game [Community Game] is finished, the experimenter will compile the 
results and prepare an envelope for each participant in this room. These envelopes will then be 
distributed. The envelope will contain information about how the other person decided and what 
the result of the game was. The sum you are allotted will also be in the envelope. The receivers 
in the other room will also get an envelope with the money that the computer was allotted, but no 
further information.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix B.3: Instructions in Study 2 
Stockholm Market Game [Community Game]58, Instructions 
 
Hi and welcome. You are going to take part in the stock market game [community game]. For 
your participation you will get compensation. This compensation is dependent on the choices 
you make.  
 
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come and help you. Do not ask questions without raising your hand first. It is 
also important that you do not speak to the other participants while the experiment is taking 
place!  
 
In the stock market game [community game] you are paired up with a computer. To the com-
puter a receiver is connected. The receiver is a person sitting in another room. You will not get 
any information about who the receiver is, neither before nor after the experiment. The receiver 
will not get information about your identity either.  
 
The receiver makes no decision during the experiment but get the compensation that the com-
puter is allotted. The receiver has received a copy of these instructions and has been told orally 
that he/she will receive the compensation that the computer is allotted.  
 
The stock market game [community game] looks like this: 
 
                              Stock market game [Community game] 
 
  You 
  A B 
 
The com-
puter / the 
receiver 
 
A 
50 80
50 5 
 
B 
5 20
80 20 
 
You and the computer choose simultaneously between A and B. Depending on your respective 
choices, you end up in one of the four squares in the matrix above. The bold numbers in the up-
per right corner represents, in Swedish kronor, what you get and the numbers in the lower left 
corner represents what the receiver gets.  
 
Examples: 
• If both you and the computer choose A you get 50 kronor and the receiver gets 50 
kronor.  
                                                 
58 The name ‘stock market game’ was used in treatment 1’ and the name ‘community game’ was used in treatment 
2’. 
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• If both you and the computer choose B you get 20 kronor and the receiver gets 20 
kronor.  
• If you choose A and the computer chooses B you get 5 kronor and the receiver gets 
80 kronor.  
• If you choose B and the computer chooses A you get 80 kronor and the receiver 
gets 5 kronor.  
 
When the computer chooses between A and B it is done in the following way: the choice is done 
randomly with the same probability that the computer will choose A as B (i.e. like flipping a coin 
between option A and B).   
 
Please note that you will not know anything about the decision of the computer when you make 
your decision.  
 
Write your decision on the form marked “answering form”. Then turn the form upside-down and 
put it in front of you.   
 
When the stock market game [community game] is finished, the experimenter will compile the 
results and prepare an envelope for each participant. These envelopes will then be distributed. 
The envelope will contain information about how the computer decided and what the result of 
the game was. The sum you are allotted will also be in the envelope. The receivers in the other 
room will also get an envelope with the money that the computer was allotted, and information 
about your choice and the choice of the computer.  
 
Thank you for your participation!  
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Appendix B.4: Instructions in Study 3 
Stock Market Game [Community Game]59, Instructions 
 
Hi and welcome. You are going to take part in the stock market game [community game]. For 
your participation you will get compensation. This compensation is dependent on the choices 
you make.  
 
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come and help you. Do not ask questions without raising your hand first. It is 
also important that you do not speak to the other participants while the experiment is taking 
place!  
 
In the stock market game [community game] you are paired up with a person in another room. 
The persons in one of the rooms are called player 1 and the persons in the other room are called 
player 2. You and everyone else in your room are player 1 (2). You will not get any information 
about who the person in the other room is and he/she will not get any information about your 
identity, neither before nor after the experiment. All the persons in both rooms have received 
these instructions.   
 
The stock market game [community game] looks like this: 
 
 
                              Stock market game [Community game] 
 
  Player 1 
  A B 
 
Player 2 
 
A 
50 80
50 5 
 
B 
5 20
80 20 
 
Player 1 first chose between A and B without knowing which choice player 2 will make. There-
after player 2 chose between A and B, given that she knows which choice player 1 has made. 
The bold numbers in the upper right corner represents, in Swedish kronor, what player 1 get and 
the numbers in italics in the lower left corner represents what player 2 gets.  
 
Examples: 
• If both player 1 and player 2 choose A you both get 50 kronor.  
• If both player 1 and player 2 choose B you both get 20 kronor.  
• If player 1 choose A and player 2 choose B, player 1 get 5 kronor and player 2 gets 
80 kronor.  
                                                 
59 The name ‘stock market game’ was used in treatment 1’’ and the name ‘community game’ was used in treatment 
2’’. 
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• If player 1 choose B and player 2 choose A, player 1 get 80 kronor and player 2 
gets 5 kronor.  
 
Player 1 write down their choice on the form marked “answering form (player 1)” and player 2 
write down their choice on the form marked “answering form (player 2)”. Player 2 writes down 
their choice both for the case when player 1 chose A and for the case when player 1 chose B (the 
choice of player 2 for the choice actually made by player 1 will then be used to determine the 
payments). When you have made your choice, turn the form upside-down and put it in front of 
you.  
 
The experimenters then collect the forms in both rooms and prepare an envelope for each par-
ticipant that contains the payment of each participant. These envelopes will then be distributed 
and the experiment is then over.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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C: Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix C.1: Experimental Instructions 
Stage 1 
SALIVA COLLECTION INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Rinse your mouth with the water that is provided on your desk. 
2. Imagine eating your favorite food and allow saliva to pool in your mouth. 
3. Tilt your head forward, drool down the straw (or directly into the tube) and collect saliva in 
the vial. 
4. Repeat as often as necessary until sufficient sample is collected (the vial should be at least 3/4 
full with clear fluid). 
5. If your mouth is dry, gently chew on the end of the straw. This will stimulate saliva produc-
tion. 
6. Please make sure the cap on your vial is closed tightly. 
7. Press the OK button after you have handed in your vial. 
DON'T: Drink water during saliva collection. 
DON'T: Provide saliva sample that is all foam. 
OK 
Stage 2 
Thank you for participating in this study. Please read, and listen to, the following instructions 
carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the help button. Aside from 
this, no communication is allowed during the study. This study is about decision making. Every-
one will receive a show-up fee of $10 for participating in the study. You have the opportunity to 
make more money depending on the decisions you and others make. Everything that you earn 
will be paid out in cash either during the study or at the end of it, before you leave. The study 
consists of several different parts. Each part will come with an explanation of the task. The first 
part will only involve hypothetical questions. Please answer them truthfully. OK  
Stage 3 
[Unincentivized price estimation task] 
Stage 4 
COMPETITION 
We now move on to part 2, which is a competition. 
Stage 5 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPETITION 
This is your main opportunity to win money in this study! In this part of the study you will com-
pete in a "Rock, Paper, Scissors" game against another person. You will be matched with another 
person and go into a competition room with that person and a member of the staff. The "Rock, 
Paper, Scissors" game works like this. In each game you choose Rock, Paper or Scissors and 
your opponent does the same.   In this game, Rock beats Scissors,  Sicssors beats Paper and Pa-
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per beats Rock. This is illustrated in the picture to the right. You will play a total of 15 rounds of 
"Rock, Paper, Scissors" against your opponent.  The winner of the game is the person who has 
won the most of these 15 rounds. When you walk into the competition room, you and your op-
ponent will both be given $5[15]. The person who wins the "Rock, Paper, Scissors" game keeps 
their own $5[15] and wins an extra $5 from the opponent. The person who loses the "Rock, Pa-
per, Scissors" game will lose [their] $5 to their opponent. Hence, from the competition, the win-
ner will take home $10[20] and the loser will not take home anything [$10]. Please wait in your 
seat until a member of the staff comes and tells you that it is time for your competition! 
[Competition takes place in separate rooms] 
Stage 6 
Welcome back from the competition! Did you win or lose? WIN LOSE 
Stage 7 
Use the paper and pen that are available on your desk. Write down your experiences during the 
"Rock, Paper, Scissors"-competition. Please include expectations, strategies contemplated and 
used, the pace and mood of the competition and the outcome. Make sure to describe your feel-
ings throughout. You have a total of 5 minutes available for this task. When you have finished, 
press the OK button below. 
Stage 8 
We now move over to the next part. OK 
Stage 9 
In this part you will make 10 decisions between pairs of choices. In each case, you will choose 
between an amount of money that you could earn for certain, and a coin toss that gives you a 
50% chance of earning $10, and a 50% chance of earning nothing. When you have made your 10 
decisions, one of the questions will be randomly chosen to determine your earnings in this part. 
If you have chosen the certain amount of money in this question, you will get this amount. If you 
have chosen the coin toss, the outcome of a computerized coin toss will determine whether you 
are paid $10 or $0. Click next to the alternative that you prefer for each decision: 
Stage 10 
SALIVA COLLECTION INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Rinse your mouth with the water that is provided on your desk. 
2. Imagine eating your favorite food and allow saliva to pool in your mouth. 
3. Tilt your head forward, drool down the straw (or directly into the tube) and collect saliva in 
the vial. 
4. Repeat as often as necessary until sufficient sample is collected (the vial should be at least 3/4 
full with clear fluid). 
5. If your mouth is dry, gently chew on the end of the straw. This will stimulate saliva produc-
tion. 
6. Please make sure the cap on your vial is closed tightly. 
7. Press the OK button after you have handed in your vial. 
DON'T: Drink water during saliva collection. 
DON'T: Provide saliva sample that is all foam. 
OK  
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